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Abstract 
The persistently high level of youth unemployment places policy makers across Europe 
under considerable pressures to accommodate the situation. This thesis seeks to 
provide insight into the general situation in four countries; Germany, the UK, France and 
Spain. It is confided to the analysis of descriptive empirics, across countries and time. 
Furthermore, an illustrative analysis of labor market efficiency will be given through 
utilizing the Beveridge curve relation. A comparative analysis will be exploring 
differences in policy response, with the purpose of providing suggestions for future 
policy. I argue that the recession have contributed to an acceleration of structural 
changes in the labor market. Moreover, the countries under most strain are advised to 
draw on successful experiences from those who have fared better, although this might 
not be politically favorable.  
Keywords: Youth Unemployment, Great Depression, Great Recession, Beveridge Curves, 
Labor Market Efficiency, The Lost Generation 
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Summary 
The turbulence experienced by the world economy since 2008 bears numerous 
similarities to the Great Depression. Firstly, both erupted in the United States and 
affected the world through trade flows, capital flows and commodity prices. Secondly, 
both crises emerged after a period of declining lending standards leading to large real-
estate booms. This was in both cases followed by reversal of expectations and lowered 
confidence among economic agents. In turn, this resulted in downward pressure on 
equity prices, increased uncertainty causing liquidity to evaporate, and reduced 
aggregate demand. Furthermore, both crises occurred after eras where technology was 
advancing at a higher velocity than the economy could adjust to.  
The objective of my thesis is to provide useful insight into the nature of the recession. I 
am particularly interested in the consequence for the younger generation of Europe. I 
will shed light on the following questions: What are the similarities between the two 
crises? Why have the youth become the uttermost strained subgroup of the population 
during this crisis? Is there a need for deep structural reforms, and if so, how can the 
adjustment processes be implemented most efficiently? 
With regard to analyzing these topics, I commence by presenting descriptive empirics 
aiming at providing a general overview of the situation of four selected countries. The 
countries selected are Germany, the UK, France and Spain. The decision was based on 
the role these countries held during the two crises. It is seven years since the pre-crisis 
peak of industrial production, and none of the countries have been able to surpass this 
benchmark. Although, the overall fall in investment and production have contributed to 
a dangerously weak labor market, it is clear that the world escaped a second depression. 
The statistics illustrate that the youth have suffered a disproportionate share of job 
losses in the current crisis, in comparison with the Great Depression. Moreover, there is 
a clear asymmetry related to the crises impact between countries.  
The persistence of the labor market slack is analyzed using Beveridge curves. This 
analysis provides insight into the cyclical and structural components inherent in the 
unemployment figures. It is becoming increasingly evident that labor markets are 
indeed undergoing structural change. The tendency for high unemployment to persist, 
meanwhile other economic indicators return to trend, suggest presence of inefficiency in 
the matching process. The Beveridge curve illustrates that only Germany has 
experienced an improvement in labor market efficiency since the crisis commenced. 
This was chiefly due to the implementation of the successful Hertz labor market reforms 
earlier in the decade.  
I recommend other countries to follow the German example in terms of enhancing 
vocational training and certified transferable occupational skills. This is confirmed to be 
highly effective, and countries with low and stable unemployment rates, typically, do 
offer vocational training in accordance with the employers’ current demand. Boone & 
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van Ours (2004) argues that increased spending on labor market training is the most 
effective form of intervention to improve the youth’s situation. Dolado (2015) finds lack 
of vocational training as one of the main reasons behind high youth unemployment, and 
recommends European governments to devote substantial resources to active labor 
market policies for the young. 
In section 5, I provide an outline of the prominent characteristics and consequences of 
youth unemployment. A major contributor to youth unemployment is their lack of 
experience, and this is especially a weakness for the lower skilled subgroup. 
Furthermore, I find that a disproportionate share of temporary employees is young. The 
low dismissal cost related to temporary positions resulted in an extensive dismissal of 
young employees. This consequence was significantly outstanding in Spain. I further 
suggest that enhanced integration of European labor markets would dampen the 
asymmetry of the systemic crisis’ impact on European regions. I believe that further 
encouragement of labor mobility can foster economic stability and absorb adverse 
shocks. Higher labor mobility is inclined to improve the matching efficiency by balancing 
the supply of and demand for labor, leading to increased economic growth (Krause et al., 
2014). It will be challenging for the ECB to maintain full employment and price stability 
across the Eurozone without increased labor mobility, particularly, because the 
geographical domain of the Eurozone does not coincide with a geographical fiscal 
authority domain. Therefore, improved adjustment mechanisms to combat regional 
asymmetries, such as enhanced fiscal integration, should be implemented. If long term 
stability is to be achieved, in my opinion, increased political unification is necessary, 
advocated by the heterogeneity of the Eurozone countries. 
In addition to strengthen applicability of the youth’s skillset across countries, I conclude 
that improved economic growth is prominent to sustain a long term labor market 
improvement. In order to prevent a longer-lasting exclusion from the labor market, the 
excessive level of youth unemployment facing Europe today is in urgent need of efficient 
policy action. To relieve this situation the workforce composition must be reformed to 
become suitable for the structural change of the European labor market (André, et al., 
2013). Real economic growth must be further advocated as this is required for long term 
utilization of available resources. The European Commission is confident that the Youth 
Guarantee implemented in 2013 has a prominent role in improving the labor market 
situation. The efficiency of the Youth Guarantee depend on policymakers’ ability to 
address the structural strain of the labor market, otherwise Europe might be deprived of 
a generation. 
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1 Introduction  
Marking the possible end of the Great Moderation we entered the most severe financial 
and economic crisis since the 1930s; the Great Recession (Quiggin, 2010).1  Most 
industrialized countries have experienced a demand side failure during the past seven 
years. Keynes’ words from the Great Depression are again of high importance as we are 
confronting the return of depression economics (Krugman, 2009). 
“But to-day we have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the 
control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand. The result is 
that our possibilities of wealth may run to waste for a time—perhaps for a long time.”2 
 -John Maynard Keynes 
The main objective of this paper is to develop an understanding of the main differences 
between the Great Depression and today’s Great Recession, focusing on the 
consequences for Europe and youth unemployment.3 Determining the nature of the 
unemployment situation we are facing is of high importance when selecting the 
appropriate policy response. The social and economic problems related to high levels of 
unemployment are often linked with negative externalities such as; violence, crime, 
reduced confidence and social unrest (Helliwell & Huang, 2011). Furthermore, 
unemployment represents a waste of human capacities. The fact that unutilized human 
resources, as other durable goods, tend to depreciate over time raises the urgency of the 
situation. Exploring lessons from the past is advantageous when determining what 
caused the crises, what can be done to heal the wounds, and how to prevent a 
reoccurrence.  
Both crises erupted in the US after years of credit-fueled spending booms, and led to 
widespread consequences on economic performance, labor productivity and 
employment around the world. The Great Recession has caused the steepest, and most 
prolonged, collapse of world trade and labor market downturn in the postwar era. The 
core of this paper relates to the issue of youth unemployment, which is currently a more 
dramatic problem than during the Great Depression. If the trend does not turn, this 
might lead to a “Lost Generation” (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011).4 The lack of recovery in 
the labor market has led to a substantial increase in long-term unemployment (Elsby et 
al., 2011).5 A significant component of this increase in unemployment is cyclical, but it is 
becoming increasingly clear that structural changes play a major role in creating the 
labor market imbalances (Dobbs, et al., 2012).  
                                                          
1 The term the Great Moderation was first used by Stock and Watson in their 2002 paper: Has the Business Cycle 
Changed and Why? This paper is referring to the American business cycle, but a similar reduction in volatility is also 
seen in Europe. 
2 This quote, from John Maynard Keynes’ book; The Great Slump of 1930 is also highly relevant for the situation today. 
3 Youth unemployment refers to the age group 15-24. 
4 The popularity of term “the Lost Generation”, originates in Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, where it is used 
to describe the generation coming of age during WWI (the same generation was known as the “Generation of 1914” in 
Europe). Similarly to now, the term refers to a disoriented or directionless generation. 
5 There has been an increase in long term unemployment, both as a share of the labor force and as a share of 
unemployment in most of the Eurozone 
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The main literature of these types of comparisons has been focused on the United States 
(Almunia et al., 2010).6 However, both crises were and are world phenomena, and 
countries are heterogeneous in terms of impact and policy response (Eichengreen & 
O'Rourke, 2009). Therefore, I find it useful to provide a comparative analysis with a 
European perspective. I believe reducing the period of secular stagnation in Europe 
should be of high priority. To accomplish this, it is necessary to learn from the past and 
adapt these lessons to our reality. This paper, therefore, analyzes and compares four 
European countries: the UK, Germany, Spain and France. The countries are selected to 
display a vast variation, in both crises impact and policy action, within the European 
economies, both across countries and across time.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the methods and data used in this study. Section 3 is an illustrative comparison of the 
crises impact on various variables. Section 4 analyzes the consequence of the recession’s 
persistence on the labor market in the selected countries, using Beveridge curves. 
Section 5 provides a discussion of the European youth, a possible “lost generation”. 
Fiscal and monetary policy responses across countries and time are presented and 
compared in section 6. The final section concludes the paper with suggestions for future 
development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Possibly since this was the crises country of origin, but likely also because more extensive statistics are available for 
the US. 
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2 Outline of Method  
A full structural analysis comparing the Great Depression and the Great Recession would 
perhaps require a structural vector autoregressive model. This would ideally be created 
using an extensive and reliable data set, analyzed with detailed historical information. 
This paper takes a much simpler approach, namely it presents a literature review of 
existing journal articles accompanied by descriptive empirics. Although this does not 
substitute a full analysis, it yields insight to similarities and differences between the two 
eras. This can be found useful in itself; additionally it might contribute to identification 
of possible future policies.  
Questions discussed in this paper include: Why has the European youth suffered a 
disproportionate share of job losses in the current crisis, compared to 1929? What can 
the Beveridge curves reveal about the persistence of the shock on the labor market 
changes? Are the labor market changes purely cyclical, or are we facing structural 
changes? What lessons can we draw from the past, and how should we move forward? 
Section 3 analyzes descriptive empirics comparing the two crises.7 The illustrations of 
key economic indicators (except from unemployment) are normalized and parallel to 
each other, commencing from their pre-crisis peak,8 aiming to create a simple overview 
of the differences and similarities. Primarily, the variables used for comparison are 
unemployment, GDP and industrial production. These are chosen as economic health 
indicators. Industrial production and GDP are measures of economic activity, and they 
are expected to drop during times of economic hardship. The unemployment rate serves 
as an important welfare indicator, as it reflects the performance of the labor market. A 
number of additional variables are also included in the analysis. These variables are 
used as country-specific welfare indicators, and this may vary across the studied 
countries. 
To analyze the present situation in the labor market, section 4 compare Beveridge 
curves across countries based on the past 12-15 years (Abraham & Katz, 1986). The 
time frame is selected to give a slightly broader perspective by presenting the labor 
market situation in the countries prior to the crisis. The Beveridge curve is a graphical 
presentation of the negative relationship between job vacancies and unemployment. 
This relationship provides an important, but simple, indicator of the health of the labor 
market, by analyzing the efficiency of the matching process. The curve is used in this 
paper, to give an indication about the endurance of the labor market slack facing Europe. 
 
                                                          
7 This section is inspired by the readership record VOX column, A tale of two depressions, by economists Kevin 
O’Rourke and Barry Eichengreen (2009), who, in turn, were inspired by Paul Krugman’s widely read blog. 
8 The month of pre-crisis peak, June 1929 (Q2) and April 2008 (Q1), are selected based on the world pre-crisis peak of 
industrial production. These dates will therefore not be the peak for all countries and all variables, but used 
consistently to display an equal timeframe. 
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2.1 Data Critique 
Statistics from the Great Recession is primarily collected from Eurostat and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as national 
statistics agencies. The choice of the source has been determined by the length of the 
series and the collection method. Data from the Great Depression is mainly collected 
from the League of Nations, but supplemented with data from various volumes of the 
Cambridge Economic History, edited by Postan, Coleman and Mathias, and Maddison’s 
Historical Statistics. Cases where other sources are utilized will be acknowledged in the 
corresponding section. The time interval used for analysis are the years following the 
onset of the Great Depression and the Great Recession, but slight variations depending 
on statistical availability will occur. 
The unemployment rates for the recent years are collected from Eurostat’s database for 
all the selected countries, and are seasonally adjusted and harmonized.9 When analyzing 
unemployment, it is important to be aware that the definition of being unemployed is 
not homogenous across countries. Most countries, however, count an individual as 
unemployed if this person does not work, but is available and actively searching for a job. 
Nevertheless, such a definition might be subject heterogeneous interpretation.10 Due to 
this possible source of comparison bias, I will use the harmonized unemployment rate 
for the selected countries. This rate is adjusted to conform to standardized guidelines of 
defining unemployment. Therefore, it ensures the maximum potential for international 
labor market comparability.11 The main problem with unemployment statistics is 
underestimation of unemployment. There are always individuals who do not register 
themselves as unemployed, especially among those who cannot claim benefits. Also, if a 
negative shock to the labor market is highly persistent, some will be inclined to drop out 
of the labor force due to discouragement and lowered confidence (Levitas, 1996).  
Unemployment figures from the depression are collected from the League of Nations for 
Germany, from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and Garside (1977) for the UK, 
and Eichengreen and Hatton (1988) for France. The UK is the only country where a 
comparison of unemployment and youth unemployment from the depression is possible, 
as the gathering of these statistics for the other countries have been unsuccessful. In the 
case of Spain, the series is largely incomplete, as no official unemployment statistics 
were collected before 1933 or during the Spanish Civil War. This weakens the analysis 
                                                          
9 All data series used in this paper will be seasonally adjusted, if available, to reduce seasonal fluctuation. If it is not 
available this will be stated in the relevant section. 
10 It is mainly the criteria that an unemployed person should be actively seeking work, which can be interpreted 
differently across countries. There are mainly two subcategories here that differ nationwide; what type of work the 
person is looking for and how actively searching is defined. 
11 These guidelines were adopted by the 13th Conference of Labor Statisticians and are referred to as the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) guidelines. The data is gathered through a Labor Force Survey, answered by a 
representative part of the population. Unemployment is defined as a working-age person without paid work, but 
currently available and seeking work during the reference period. Specific criteria can be read by following this link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3888793/5834669/KS-CC-06-001-EN.PDF/bdde7b22-1eca-408d-8ba1-
26005af93932?version=1.0  
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as years of importance are missing. Data for available years is collected from Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica (INE).12  
The data on job vacancies, defined as unfilled job positions, are publicly available. 
Unfortunately, the figures are not entirely comparable across countries, as they are 
based on different data collection methodologies. Because the Beveridge curve displays 
the relationship between job vacancies and unemployment across time, and not across 
countries, this will not distort the individual country analysis. However, it is important 
to keep in mind this statistical bias when comparing countries.  
Job vacancies and employment in the UK and Spain are collected from Eurostat, and the 
job vacancy rate (𝑣) is found by dividing number of vacancies by the sum of vacancies (V) 
and employed individuals (E, occupied positions), 𝑣 =
𝑉
𝑉+𝐸
. The same method is used for 
Germany and France, but with numbers from OECD due to longer available time series. 
The collection methodologies differ in the following way: in France the job vacancy data 
is collected through general employment surveys, whereas in Spain, Germany and the 
UK, the data is collected via dedicated job-vacancy surveys answered by employers 
(Eurostat, 2010). Neither of these methods likely accounts for all vacancies. Hence, there 
is an exposure to statistical bias.13 To exemplify, positions filled without formal job 
postings, or jobs filled quickly, are usually not included in job vacancy statistics. 
Furthermore, due to different measurement and presentation methods, different 
statistics providers might offer a slight variety in the reported data. These differences, 
however, do not affect the conclusion of the curve as the relative relationship between 
periods is highly correlated. The Beveridge curve analysis will focus on the Great 
Recession due to, both, lack of data availability and data reliability at earlier dates. 
This paper includes stock market indices (if available), as it gives an impression of the 
economic agents’ expectations about the future economic health of the nation. This gives 
an indication of their confidence and the effectiveness of policy actions. The stock 
indices from the current crisis were all established after the depression, which reduces 
the quality of comparison across time. However, an impression of the agents’ confidence 
will be visible through their reaction in the case of both crises.  
 
The next section provides a graphical presentation of the variables of importance in 
explaining the crises impact on various key indicators. 
 
                                                          
12 The data available for Spain is number of registered unemployed (wholly and partially), and not as a percentage of 
the labor force. Due to varying information regarding the labor force the statistics is not converted into percentage. 
The data is consistent with the numbers reported by the League of Nations. 
13 This bias is likely largest for France. For example Activité et conditions d’emploi de la main-d’oeuvre (Acemo), 
which collects vacancy data in France, exclude firms with less than ten employees and the farming sector. According 
to Zanda and Fondeur (2009), the Acemo vacancy statistics accounts only for 1/3 of job openings placed with the 
public employment service. France is one of four countries (Italy, Denmark and Malta) who do not provide a full 
coverage of vacancy statistics. Autumn 2010, France changed their questionnaire on job vacancies to reduce the bias 
which led to an increase in reported vacancies, as displayed in section 4.4. 
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3 The Impact of the Crises  
The Great Depression is one of the most significant episodes in economic history and 
marks the beginning of macroeconomics as a distinct discipline (Bernake, 1995). This 
period shattered the flawless view of the capitalist system and free markets. However, 
as these memories faded it seems that economists at large turned back to this vision of 
rational agents interacting in a world of perfect markets. Paul Krugman (2009) argues 
that, as in 1929, this immersive ideology led economists to ignore the signs of the 
commencing recession, caused by imperfect markets, irrational agents and flawed 
institutions.  
There are many similarities between the crisis commencing in 1929 and the crisis now, 
both in terms of cause and effect. Firstly, both erupted in the United States and affected 
the world through trade flows, capital flows and commodity prices. Secondly, both crises 
emerged after a period of declining lending standards, leading to large real-estate booms. 
This was in both cases followed by reversal of expectations and lowered confidence 
among economic agents, which in turn resulted in downward pressure on equity prices, 
increased uncertainty causing liquidity to evaporate, and reduced aggregate demand. 
The quote by Keynes in the introduction is as suitable today, as it was when he wrote it 
in 1930. Aikins (2009) argues that periodic global economic crises occur, primarily, due 
to ineffective regulatory governance and the failure to learn from the past. Several other 
economists also argue that this crisis could have been largely avoided if the world had 
remembered the lessons from the past (Krugman, 2009). In the period between these 
two crises; rational agents, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models14 and the 
efficient-market hypothesis received widespread acceptance. This contributed to 
deregulation of the market, financial destabilization and increasing the availability of 
complex assets that few were capable of comprehend (Wolf, 2014). As this unraveled, 
the Great Recession was further worsened by the sovereign debt crisis, which had a 
highly detrimental impact the peripheral nations in Europe.  
The acceleration of the recession was exponential, after originating by affecting the 
financial and construction sectors, immediate international contagion followed 
(Pissarides C. , 2013). On the 15th of September 2008, after a year of speculation about 
banks’ overvalued derivatives, dampened confidence and interbank activities, the world 
learned that no corporation was “too big to fail”.15 As a consequence, we saw economies 
jump into freefall. Instead of seeing signs of recovery the world faced an additional crisis, 
                                                          
14 The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model is a merger of the Real Business Cycle literature and the New 
Keynesianism produced in the 2000s. It is based on the general equilibrium models developed in 1950s by Arrow and 
Debreu. In these models any variation in employment and output were caused by optimal responses to changes in 
preferences, technology or the world market. The DSGE models implemented sticky prices, allowing recessions to 
occur. 
15 The term “too big to fail” refers to the common belief that the Government would be willing to bail out corporations 
whose failure would have a disastrous outcome on the greater economy. This quote was proven wrong when the US 
Government decided not to bail out their fourth largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers. 
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the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Since 2008, the changing pattern 
of the global financial order has become more visible.16  
The recession has officially ended in most countries; the Second Great Depression has 
been avoided (at least for the moment). However, seven years into the Great Recession 
several countries have not been able to reach their pre-crisis peak level of various key 
economic indicators (Ormerod, 2014).17 Large parts of the world are still facing a 
demand side failure with private spending insufficient for utilizing economies’ available 
productive capacity.  
This section provides an illustrative overview of the two crises in the selected countries, 
by explaining the cause and consequence of both the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 The crisis’ consequence on advanced economies was relatively more significant and more persistent, than on 
developing countries. This has contributed to the rise in economic power of developing countries, particular the 
BRIC’s (Drezner & McNamara, 2013). 
17 This paper will use the standard definition of a recession; reduction in GDP over two successive quarters, ending 
when output grows again. 
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3.1 Germany  
Germany was the first and most heavily affected European country during the Great 
Depression. In the time of the Weimar Republic, Germany suffered from a highly volatile 
business cycle, also before the depression. There was hyperinflation, political instability, 
massive unemployment and civil unrest. Prior to the depression, Germany was also one 
of the countries experiencing an economic boom. This period is often referred as “the 
golden twenties”, and was characterized by economic growth and rapid developments in 
culture and arts. The golden twenties were reached with help from the US (Dawes Plan 
and Young Plan).18 As a result of the close ties to the US, the depression quickly found its 
way to Europe through Germany, who could no longer rely on American credit.  
The figures display comparisons of the 
Great Depression and the Great 
Recession, and in Germany’s case it is 
utterly clear that the situation today is 
far from the one in the 1930s. 
Germany is no longer thought of as 
“the sick man of Europe”, but a major 
engine in the heart of Europe’s 
“virtuous core”.19 Their social market 
economy has been of great benefit 
when stabilizing economic 
expectations in the presence of the 
global recession. During the recent 
crisis, Germany experienced only a 
relatively modest drop in GDP during 2009. At the time of the Great Depression, GDP did 
not return to the pre-crisis level until six years later.20 
When turning to industrial production in Germany, there has been a significant drop, 
followed by a relatively rapid recovery. Unfortunately, the recovery seems to have 
stagnated since 2012.21 The lack of ability to overcome this slowdown is largely 
contingent on the political tensions related to the Russia-Ukraine crisis began in April 
2014, as this has reduced German export demand and weakened confidence. Autumn 
                                                          
18 These funds from the US were aimed at helping Germany pay the war reparations owed to the winners of the war, 
as well as improving their own welfare and maintaining the gold value of their currency (Temin, 2010). 
19 At least what could be called a “virtuous core” before the Sovereign debt crisis emerged. 
20 The GDP data from the Great Depression are from Angus Maddison’s World Economy: Historical Statistics, pp. 428. 
The data from the Great Recession are provided by Eurostat. 
21 The seasonally adjusted monthly index of industrial production for the Great Recession is collected by OECD. The 
data from the Depression are from League of Nations, and is calculated as an arithmetic average of 31 items based 
mainly on actual production. The weights are intended to represent the coefficients value added by manufacture; but 
as accurate net production figures were not available, they were based on the average number of workers employed 
and the motor-power installed in each industry in 1925. Both series are seasonally adjusted. 
80
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Figure 1 – Comparison of the impact on GDP during the Great 
Depression and the Great Recession. 
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2014, Germany experienced the largest drop in industrial production in more than five 
years.22  
In comparison with the depression, the 
decline has been much milder and 
arguably less alarming, as industrial 
production is now having a lower 
share of GDP and employment than in 
the 1930s (Almunia et al., 2010).23 The 
international spread of industrialized 
locations today, compared with the 
concentration of industry in the US and 
Europe in the early half of the 20th 
century, contributed to the recession’s 
global contagion. It also reduced the 
impact on any single industrialized 
country, which is a reason why the recent plummet in industrial production did not 
cause extreme unemployment rates. In 1929, Germany saw the end of a prosperous 
industrialist time of American loans used for investment. With the crisis, access to credit 
and capital vanished, at the same time as the main importer of German industrial 
exports, the US, implemented tariffs to protect domestic producers. The effect was 
downsizing and closing of numerous factories, leading to widespread unemployment, 
hunger and death (Fisher & Hornstein, 2001). The impact on industries varied, and 
possibly the worst hit was the shipbuilding industry, where about 70% of the workforce 
became unemployed within a year into the depression (Crew, 1998, pp. 71). 
Including the stock market in the 
analysis, gives an indication of the 
market confidence. The German stock 
market suffered a decline in the 
emergence of the current crisis, but 
recovered faster than most other 
countries. After the initial negative 
shock, the trend in the German stock 
market has been positive, with the 
exception of a drop in 2011. This drop 
was heavily affected by the 
preparations of the second Greek 
bailout package. This involved 
increasing bank reserves, a decrease in 
the interest on Greek debt and a write-down of 50% by holders of Greek governmental 
                                                          
22 Germany is one of the most heavily affected nations due to their strong trade ties with Russia. In addition to the EU 
and US’ sanctions on various Russian companies and individuals, including the energy industry, an example of an 
affected sector is the German automobile industry (as much of their manufacturing is placed in Russia). 
23 This is also the case for the early industrializers, France and the UK. 
-25
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71 78
Months since crisis 
The German stock market response 
1929 June 2008 April
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1935. 
Figure 2 – Comparison of how industrial production responded 
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bonds (Ardagna & Caselli, 2014). The situation today, is a sharp contrast to the situation 
during the Great Depression, where Germany still had not recovered seven years into 
the crisis.24  
One of the most devastating 
consequences of the depression was 
soaring unemployment, which led to an 
increase in the demand for a political 
reform.25 The Weimar government 
prioritized avoidance of inflation and 
budget deficits at all costs, including 
failing to stimulate growth and create 
jobs. The fiscal policies implemented to 
deal with the crisis involved raising 
taxes and reducing government 
spending.26 Furthermore, it was 
decided to cut the time period of being 
unemployed with rights to benefits, 
and exclude women and young workers from the benefit system altogether (Crew, 1998, 
pp. 72). The aim of this was to reduce the deficit and price level. As prices fell, and the 
presence of downward nominal wage rigidity was amplified by strong unions firms 
faced additional difficulties. This contributed to further increases in unemployment and 
political frustration and instability (Fisher & Hornstein, 2002).  
Germany escaped the unbearable situation in the labor market relatively early due to an 
abrupt turn in the political strategy. When Hitler won the election in 1933 he initiated 
massive expansion of public spending. This contributed to the sharp decline in 
unemployment illustrated in figure 4.27 Reducing the youth unemployment rate was also 
considered one of Hitler’s triumphs. The most important initiatives in this regard were 
the implementation of the Voluntary Youth Service and Voluntary Youth Labor that 
employed the youth to rebuild the country. Mass unemployment, especially among the 
youth, was one of the reasons why the Weimar Republic collapsed (Crew, 1998).  
The unemployed youth often possessed a high level of skills. These workers were often 
exploited as cheap labor through apprenticeships. 
The current situation in the labor market is, also, significantly different from the 
situation during the Great Depression. German unemployment is lower than it has been 
                                                          
24
 Monthly data from the recession is collected by Otto Donner (Donner, 2013), follow 329 selected stocks, and is not 
seasonally adjusted. Data from the Recession are monthly closing prices of the DAX from Yahoo finance. As the DAX 
was established in 1988 and only includes 30 large companies the comparison will not be optimal. 
25 Between 1928 and 1932 the number of unemployed without any rights to claims (mainly due to the length of 
unemployment – 39 weeks was the upper limit) increased from 8.9% to 56% of Germany’s welfare clients (Crew, 
1998, pp. 70-72). 
26 More specifically there was an increase in the tax rate by 1/5 and decline in government expenditure by 16%. 
27 The increase in public spending mainly included spending on manufacturing of machinery and armaments in 
preparation of war (Gourevitch, 1984, pp.105-112).  
Figure 4 – Comparison of the labor market response of the two 
crises. Ending in 1934Q4 and 2015Q1 
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for two decades, and has stabilized at a lower level than in other European countries. 
During the past decade, the German economy has undergone several steps to increase 
labor market efficiency. Contrary to the other countries analyzed, Germany suffered 
from increasing unemployment rates already in the early 2000’s, and therefore 
implemented the Hartz labor reforms before the Great Recession originated. These 
reforms commenced in 2003, aiming at increasing the efficiency of the matching process 
through raising the search effort by the unemployed, and the participation rate of the 
working age population, as well as making the Federal Employment Agency more 
customer-orientated (Hertweck & Sigrist, 2012).28 Furthermore, increased 
competitiveness have placed downward pressures on wage growth, and in combination 
with increased productivity, workers are now employed more cost-efficiently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 The reform is discussed in further detail in section 4. 
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3.2 The United Kingdom  
The magnitude of today’s recession is 
similar to the depression, but overall, 
there is a more positive outlook. The 
fall encountered in GDP was slightly 
milder than during the 1930s, but more 
persistent. It took 23 quarters before 
GDP recovered to the pre-crisis level, 
compared with 16 quarters into the 
Great Depression. The UK experienced 
the fastest growth in GDP (2.6%) since 
the beginning of the recession in 2014. 
However, figure 5 illustrate that the 
growth rate is currently lower than it 
was almost seven years into the Great 
Depression. Eichengreen (1992) 
argues that the main contributor of the 
relatively early recovery of output was due to the early devaluation of the pound 
sterling.29 This opened for expansionary monetary policy involving rate cuts and 
targeting a higher level of inflation. It led to increased money supply, investment and 
consumption (Howson, 1980). 
The current slowdown of growth in the UK, is due to their exposure to international 
risks, which has placed downward pressures on investments. In particular, these risks 
include increased uncertainty in the Eurozone, primarily related to the possbility that 
Greece will abandon the Euro, and the slowdown of growth in China (ICAEW, 2015). In 
addition, there is downward pressure on growth due to reduced spending by oil and gas 
companies as a concequence of the fall in price. This recution overrides the increased 
consumer spending due to the lower prices.30 The presence of several geopolitical 
foreboding forces has also contributed to lowering confidence at the moment. The cause 
of the current recession in the UK relies heavily on the low credit restrictions, which led 
to a massive housing bubble, as well as their exposure to the financial sector and the 
Eurozone export markets (UKCES, 2014). As a consequence of the bubble bursting, the 
housing prices fell, and this had a direct negative effect on employment in the 
construction sector due to falling demand.31 This, in turn, led to reduced consumption, 
which was severely amplified by the break-down of the financial system (Krugman, 
2009, pp. 179-181).  
                                                          
29 The UK and most of their trade partners returned to the gold standard between 1925 and 1927 believing that this 
would cause stability and prosperity. Instead the gold standard reduced the UK’s competitiveness and curtailed 
monetary policy options. Similarly to today, monetary policy action was constrained by a system combining highly 
dissimilar economies. This will be discussed further in section 6. 
30 According to the Office for National Statistics, business investments fell at the highest rate in six years during the fall 
of 2014. This fall was mainly driven by oil and gas companies’ response to the plummet of oil prices. 
31 This is similar to the experience in Spain and the US.  
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Figure 5 – This figure display the GDP growth rates of the two 
crises. The figure indicates that the UK experienced a double 
dip recession during the depression as they were in a recession 
from 1930Q2-1931Q3 and 1932Q2-1932Q3. The official 
recession in the current crisis lasted from 2008Q2-2009Q2. 
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Figure 6 – Comparison of the impact from international trade 
is measured by exports. Ending December 2014 and July 1936. 
There was a large sectoral dispersion 
of the reaction to the depression. The 
sectors that were disproportionally hit 
by negative shocks were mostly 
involved in export industries (coal, 
steel, iron and shipbuilding). These 
were lacking modernization after 
World War I, and struggled with 
increased competition from abroad. 
After a decade with downward trend, 
exports plummeted when the Great 
Depression emerged.32 However, not 
all sectors suffered; for example, in 
South-East England, the chemical, electrical and automobile industries blossomed when 
the prices fell during the depression. The depression contribted to a change in the 
composition of their production, namely a decline in “staple trades” and an increase in 
modern industries (Eichengreen, 1992, pp. 214). 
The reduction in export demand was 
also a severe consequence for the UK in 
the current global crisis. The response 
of world international trade was more 
abrupt, but luckily the shock did not 
display the same degree of persistence. 
Figure 6 display a comparison of the 
shock on exports during both crises, 
and it is clear that the persistence of 
the shock was larger in the 1930s.33 
The reduction in export demand 
largely contributed to a major drop in 
industrial production, which raised 
unemployment massively.34  The level 
of industrial production is currently 
growing slower than what it was seven years into the Great Depression (Jackson, 1985). 
The persistence of the adverse shock to production is stronger today, but the shock itself 
was milder.  
                                                          
32 Export data from the depression are collected from NBER Macrohistory, chapter 7 on foreign trade (file m07024). 
NBER collected the figures from the Board of Trade, and it is checked by the Royal Economic Society. The figures from 
the Great Recession are collected from OECD. 
33 A similar illustration can be found for imports and trade volume. 
34 Statistics on industrial production and GDP during the Great depression are collected from a paper on monthly 
estimates of inter-war data in Britain created by James Mitchell, Solomos Solomou and Martin Weale (2012) using a 
mixed stage estimation procedure based on the League of Nations quarterly numbers. The statistics from the Great 
Recession are collected by OECD. 
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The reaction in the stock market was 
more immediate compared to 1929, 
likely because of more interactive 
world equity markets, and the credit 
boom experienced by the UK. The UK 
did not experience a real credit boom 
in the 1920s, and this contributed to a 
lesser reaction in the stock market (De 
Long & Grossman, 1993). Now, on the 
other hand, the UK was amongst the 
three countries experiencing largest 
credit boom in the decade before the 
recession, leading to a housing 
bubble.35 It took almost five years for 
the stock market to recover to pre-crisis level, and the recovery has been volatile.36  
During the 1920s Britain struggled to recover from major devastations obtained during 
World War I. As figure 9 indicate, the UK actually entered the depression the same year 
as the First World War ended, in 1918, and did not recover until 1934.37 Data suggest 
that the large decrease in output was contributed by a fall in labor input due to lower 
employment, and a reduction in average annual hours.38 One of the main reasons for this 
reduction was unions demanding that hours were reduced from 55 to 47 hours per 
week, from 1919 to 1920 (Cole & Ohanian, 2002). Other factors contributing to the 
lower employment and output level were a contraction of money supply, deflation, high 
real wages and overvaluation of the pound sterling. Keynes (1932) argued that the high 
wages prevented a fall in domestic prices, and with a high exchange rate this led to a 
major loss in British competitiveness. The reason for the overvaluation, which reduced 
the UK’s competitive edge, was essentially the return to the gold standard in 1925 at an 
overvalued rate. The negative effect on export demand dampened economic growth 
(Moggridge, 1972, pp. 106-108). Bank of England (BoE) kept interest rates high to 
maintain the peg to gold, and the UK suffered from deflation or zero price growth 
between 1921 and 1934 (O'Donoghue, Goulding, & Allen, 2004).  
It is possible to argue against these causes of the time of economic hardship in the UK. 
The first argument is that the UK entered a recession before money supply and inflation 
contracted, indicating that this cannot be the cause of the depression.39 Another 
                                                          
35 The two others being the US and Spain. 
36 The stock market figure uses monthly data adapted by NBER on the security price index for the Great Depression 
and FTSE100 (100 largest companies in terms of market cap listed on the London stock exchange) for the current 
recession. 
37 Data on annual real GDP from 1920-1948 are collected from Sefton and Weale (1995): Balanced Gross Domestic 
Product at factor cost, table A.3, pages 188-189. For the period prior to 1920, Mitchell’s British Historical Statistics 
will be used (1988). For the period following 1948, data are collected from the Office for National Statistics.  
38 Working hours fell from 2700 per worker pre WWI to around 2200 from 1924 until the end of the 1930s. 
39 Data on inflation and money supply are from the Office for National Statistics. In this figure money supply is notes 
and coins in circulations, all types of money supply displayed a similar behavior. Inflation is calculated as the annual 
growth in the composite consumer price index. 
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Figure 8 - The effect on the stock market was much more 
significant during the Great Recession. Ending February 1936 
and January 2015.  
The Lost Generation of Europe 
15 
 
argument is that deflation is not bound to cause lower GDP. Several countries 
experienced deflation during the interwar years. However, these countries did not 
experience a complementary fall in GDP (e.g. France and the US). 
Cole and Ohanian (2002) argue that the 
reasons behind the tough period 
experienced by the UK, during the time 
characterized as prosperous elsewhere, 
were not the overvalued pound sterling 
or contractionary monetary policy. 
Rather, regional concentration of 
negative sectoral shocks, in 
combination with too generous 
unemployment compensation relative 
to wages and housing subsidies, were 
the main reasons for this period of 
economic distress.40 Three features of the generous unemployment situation 
contributed to issues of both adverse selection and moral hazard. The benefits were 
independent of the individual’s employment history and past wage. Also, benefits could 
be collected from the first day of unemployment without any upper time limit. The 
safety-net in existence today is significantly more generous than the alternatives back in 
the 1930s, but not relative to wages (Benjamin & Kochin, 1979). However, today’s 
welfare system has suffered from similar incentive issues as in the 1930s. The stagnating 
and falling real wages in combination of few available jobs and an increasing number of 
involuntary part-time positions, caused insufficient incentives to encourage people on 
benefits to return to employment (Brewer, Browne, & Jin, 2012).41  
When comparing total current unemployment with the rates during the depression, the 
view is a lot more positive.42 According to Rowntree (1941), 73% of the unemployed in 
1936 lived below the poverty line, and most of them were long term unemployed.43  
                                                          
40 Unemployment benefits rose drastically after WWI. The initial intention was to ease the transmission of returned 
soldiers, but with the implementation of the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1920 it covered virtually all registered 
as unemployed. The weekly benefits increased by nearly 40% relative to the level in 1911 (Cole & Ohanian, 2002). 
The housing subsidies where local policies, and significantly increased the cost of leaving depressed regions because 
the subsidy would be lost once a household relocated (Pattison et al., 2010). 
41 27.1% of part-time employees between the age of 25 and 29 report inability to find full-time employment as the 
main reason for their employment status, and increase from 15.6 in 2007. One of the initiatives implemented by the 
UK government to combat the incentive issues is the Universal Credit system (in 2013). This system aims at raising 
work incentives by implementing a universal benefit, and will be further discussed in section 4 and 6. 
42 Monthly unemployment figures from the depression are provided by James Denman and Paul McDonald in an 
article from the government statistical service. The unemployment rate for juvenile (under 18) used in this paper is 
from Garside’s paper on Juvenile Unemployment and Public Policy between the Wars, and is only available in yearly 
intervals. I have unfortunately not been able to find the unemployment rate for the age group 15-24. However, in the 
1920-30s the school leaving age was 14, and few continued formal education after this age, the average school-leaving 
age has increased significantly since. Therefore I argue that the issue of youth unemployment was related to those 
under 18, as those above 18 were then largely regarded as adult. The recent data on monthly youth unemployment 
and total unemployment are collected from Eurostat and OECD respectively.  
43 Rowntree’s poverty line was based on a weekly minimum sum necessary to enable families to live a healthy life; this 
included minimum amounts of food, rent, light, fuel, clothing and household items. In order to find out what the 
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
1918 1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936
The Cause of the Great Depression 
Money supply Inflation GDP
Figure 9 – Comparing the development of three important 
variables from the end of the First World War until 1936. 
Fernanda Winger Eggen 
16 
 
2%
5%
8%
11%
14%
17%
20%
23%
1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71 78 85
  Months since crisis 
    Unemployment response - the UK 
1929 June 2008 Apr
2008 Apr Youth 1929 Youth
Figure 10 – This figure indicate the relatively larger issue of youth 
unemployment today, compared with during the depression. The 
ending months are December 1936 and December 2014. 
However, the youth labor market is 
facing larger challenges in this 
recession. During the 1930s, juvenile 
unemployment was significantly lower 
than adult unemployment, averaging 
at only 5% between 1920 and 1938 
(Eichengreen, 1987).  The main reason 
for the low youth unemployment rate 
was the casual nature of their 
positions, in addition to demanding 
lower wages while displaying a higher 
level of mobility than adults. Positions 
making war supplies in factories were 
common.44 These “Blind-Alley” 
occupations implied working long hours, for relatively high wages45, but provided no 
transferable knowledge to be used when these workers were no longer required 
(Garside, 1977, pp. 324). Additionally, those under 16 were relatively attractive 
employees on the labor market because firms were not obliged to contribute to the 
unemployment insurance fund for employees below 16, who were not eligible for 
benefits (Garside, 1990, pp. 82). The result was exploitation of these workers, who 
would often lose their position when they turned 16. Furthermore, it reduced their 
incentive to register as unemployed, causing an underestimation of unemployed youth 
(Eichengreen, 1987, pp. 6).  
The negative impact on employment during the Great Recession was above all 
contributed by a 25% plummet in new hires. The group most sensitive to this shock was 
the young entering the professional life (Gregg, 2015). The stated causes of the high 
youth unemployment today are often related to a drop in recruiting due to the global 
recession, public sector cuts, or the youth’s lack of qualifications and experience.46 A 
major trend in the UK during the past years, seemingly reducing unemployment, has 
been unpaid internships. An individual in an unpaid internship will not be counted as 
unemployed. However, the standard of living will not necessarily be any better 
compared with someone who is unemployed, rather worse as they are not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
minimum amounts of, for example, food needed before becoming malnourished he consulted with leading 
nutritionists.  
44 This casual work usually involved queueing up outside factories or at docs at sunrise, wishing for one day of income. 
Other options included fruit picking, messengers or confectionery work (Eichengreen, 1987, pp.5).  
45 High wages relative to apprenticeship. However, apprenticeships provided the youth with the necessary skills to 
pursuit a lifelong career, but low wages. 
46 The young generation of today is historically the most qualified, and is still argued to be lacking experience and 
qualification (Gregg, 2015, pp. 75). 
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3.3 France  
France experienced a relatively mild, 
but prolonged depression in the 1930s. 
France was the last country in Europe 
to recover from the depression, and 
they were not able to reach the pre-
crisis peak of GDP until 1939.47 
Similarly to the UK, France suffered 
from great devastations as a 
consequence of World War I, in the 
1920s. France did, however, experience 
a more optimistic decade (Beaudry & 
Portier, 2002). Heavily investments in 
gold, and relatively less in stock 
exchanges, limited a possible banking crisis (only one major bank failed during the 
depression). Gold was seen as a “safe haven” during the crash in 1929 (as it also was in 
2008), and with the price increase in gold, the value of French reserves grew by about 
500% from 1927 to 30 (Jackson, 1985, pp. 25-26).48  
During the initial stages of the 
depression, export related industries 
were affected by lower international 
demand. However, as France entered 
the gold standard at an undervalued 
rate, their competitiveness was 
relatively strong compared with most 
other countries (Gourevitch, 1984, 
pp.122-125). From 1931 and onwards, 
other countries were forced to devalue, 
and the franc became relatively 
expensive (Gourevitch, 1984). This 
marked the beginning of the French 
depression, as France had enough gold reserves to refuse devaluation (Beaudry & 
Portier, 2002). This generated a major drop in export demand, followed by a plunge in 
investments and industrial production. Inconsistent government policies worsened the 
situation. More active expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, and devaluation of the 
Franc earlier than 1936, would have improved the economic situation. However, 
austerity measures were instead pushed through, causing a never-ending slump 
(Jackson, 1985). During the decade that followed the 1929 stock market crash, a 
structural reform of the French industry was launched. The tough period moved the 
                                                          
47 The recovery of GDP in 1939 was rather brief as it was followed by a larger downfall than during the depression as 
a consequence of WWII. In 1949 GDP was again back on the level of 1929 and 1939. From 1949 until the Great 
Recession, France experienced strong economic growth with only a few minor setbacks. The historical GDP figures are 
from Maddison’s Historical statistics (2006). 
48 France held 25% of the world’s gold supply in 1932.  
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effect on GDP. 
Figure 12 – Comparison of the fall in industrial production as a 
consequence of the two crises. Ending in February 2015 and 
October 1936.  
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economy away from traditional industries such as textiles (historically, the most 
important export industry), and in the direction of more technology intensive industries 
such as hydro-electric power, chemicals and petrol refining. The massive fall in 
industrial production forced France towards this transformation.49 Industrial 
production began to fall in 1929, and did not return to the pre-1929 peak level until 
1950, leaving France as the only industrial power not attaining the 1929 level of 
production until after World War II (Jackson, 1985, pp. 1-6). The recovery was set back 
by a number of deflationary policies, aimed at preventing depreciation of the currency. 
The politicians of the time were heavily criticized for ignoring the severity of the 
economic situation.50  
In the current crisis, France was also 
slower than other industrialized 
countries to join the list of countries in 
recession.51  According to the IMF’s 
mission chief for France, Anne-Marie 
Gulde, the main reasons for this 
includes that France relies relatively 
less on exports, dampening the effect of 
reduced world demand, and that the 
country has a generous social safety 
net (Vrijer & Yontcheva, 2009). 
Furthermore, France has been, and still 
is, relatively conservative in regards to 
supervision of lending institutions.52 Figure 13 illustrates France’ export demand, and 
display a severe and abrupt shock in response to the Great Recession. However, the 
persistency is milder than during the Great Depression.53 The French economy is a 
major player in international economics. France was the sixth largest exporter in the 
world in 2013.54 However, as most other industrialized countries, France has 
experienced tough competition from emerging markets during the past decades, and the 
recession accelerated this trend.55  
 
 
                                                          
49 Statistics of industrial production during the depression are gathered from the League of Nations. Corresponding 
figures from the recession are provided by OECD. 
50 In their defense this can be due to the lack of economic teaching. Teaching of economics was primary taught only to 
law students. 
51 France fell into recession in Q12009 as the last European country. 
52 Supervision of the French financial system is generally viewed to be of good quality, but the IMF has pointed out 
that they could gain from increased transparency.  
53 The source of data on exports from the Great Depression is Documents Statistique Sur Le Commerce De La France, 
the series is collected from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis’ statistical database. The current exports are reported by 
OECD in their main economic indicators database.  
54 France fell from fifth largest exporter of goods and fourth largest exporter of services in 2010. 
55 Especially in the automobile industry. 
Figure 13 – The effect on export demand in the two crises. 
Ending in January 2015 and February 1939. 
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After seven years, in March 2015 the 
French stock market, measured here by 
the CAC 40 index, again reached the 
pre-crisis level.56 The reduction in oil 
prices has contributed to increased 
GDP growth, domestic demand and 
market confidence. During the 
depression, as figure 14 illustrate, the 
effect on the stock market was 
catastrophic. The persistent low 
confidence of market participants was 
severe, but as relatively few were 
invested in stocks, the real impact was 
rather limited (Jackson, 1985). 
During the Great Depression, the French labor market suffered from a demographic 
deficiency (Hesse, 1998, pp. 184). France had experienced a declining labor force for an 
extended period of time. This was a result of a falling birth rate since 1850. The deaths of 
the First World War contributed to a further dramatic deterioration. The reduction of 
the labor force was more severe amongst the young, a quarter of those younger than 24 
were dead. The era as the most populous country in Europe was long since passed, and 
in 1939, the French writer Jean Giraudoux stated; “The Frenchman has become a rarity” 
(Mathias & Postan, 1978, pp. 319).  
The reduced labor force contributed to 
a less dramatic unemployment rate. It 
was for an extended period believed 
that France would be exempt from 
experiencing the wave of joblessness 
and economic downfall felt by others. 
These arguments were mainly based on; 
their massive gold reserves, the 
relatively large share of workers 
engaged in agriculture, and the 1,5 
million immigrant workers who could 
arguably act as a buffer for domestic 
unemployment.57 In comparison with 
other countries hit by the depression, the unemployment rate was not alarming. 
However, the growth in unemployment was extreme58 and highly localized.59  
                                                          
56 The recent stock market values are from Yahoo finance, whereas those from the 1930s are from Bulletin De La 
Statistique Generale found in NBER’s database on macrohistory. 
57 Foreigners were likely the subgroup most heavily affected by the depression in France, as they became excluded 
from the labor market (Hesse, 1998, pp. 184). The reason for the relatively large number of immigrants in France was 
due to the labor shortage, especially of manual labor, they experienced after WWI (Galenson & Zellner, 1957, pp.516). 
58 This growth in unemployment is likely heavily affected by measurement errors as there was not until 1931 that the 
issue of unemployment was raised in parliament, the standard way of measuring unemployment was counting those 
Figure 14 – Comparing the response of the French stock 
market in the two crises. Ending March 2015 and November 
1936. 
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Figure 15 – Comparison of unemployment rates during the 
two crises not normalized due to extreme growth. 
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Furthermore, there are great errors in the measurement of unemployment during this 
period, because official statistics primary counted those receiving benefits, and access to 
unemployment funds was limited.60 A breakdown of unemployment statistics by age is 
not available after 1911, and therefore not included in this analysis (Galenson & Zellner, 
1957, pp. 509). The statistics used in this paper is “applications for work” from the 
League of Nations, because this measure captures those not receiving benefits and is 
therefore, arguably, closer to the truth. However, it will still be an underestimation, for 
example it does not include discouraged workers. What is known, and supports a 
hypothesis of severe troubles in the labor market, is the increase in unemployment 
insurance funds from 27 in the fall of 1930 to 900 by fall 1935 (Jackson, 1985, p. 28-30).  
The present situation of the labor market includes relatively stable, but high 
unemployment, especially amongst the young (Cahuc & Carcillo, 2015).61 The global 
recession worsened the situation, notably within the industrial sector, but the overall 
negative impact was milder than in other countries (Haincourt & Mogliani, 2012). The 
persistent high unemployment and low labor participation in France is mainly claimed 
to be a consequence of strict employment protection legislation, high minimum wages 
and an imperfect educational system (Dolado, 2015; Labaye et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
the high prevalence of temporary contracts contributes to the impact endured by the 
younger generation.62 Employees on temporary contracts are offered less protection, 
and suffer disproportionally from cutbacks when firms find themselves in financial 
difficulties. In France, 13% of workers are employed on a temporary basis. This 
subgroup chiefly contributed to the increase in unemployment, and 60% of them lost 
their position during the recession (Labaye et al., 2012). 
France’s youth employment rate is slightly less than 30%. Integration of the increasingly 
large number of young people, who is neither employed nor looking for work, is among 
the nation’s most urgent issues (Cahuc & Carcillo, 2015).63 The dual nature of the labor 
market is an important factor contributing to labor market discrimination. A proposed 
solution is the implementation of a “single contract”; a homogenous contract of 
indeterminate duration for everyone.64 France was the first country to receive funding 
from the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) to tackle unemployment among young 
individuals, received by regions where youth unemployment is above 25%.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
receiving benefits. The statistics from the depression is collected from Eichengreen and Hatton’ s Interwar 
Unemployment (1988) 
59 Over half of the French unemployed where clustered close to the Seine until 1934. 10 out of the 101 French districts 
where hardly affected (Jackson, 1985, pp. 30). 
60 Precise numbers of unemployed exist only for March 1931 and March 1936 where 452 800 and 820 800 were the 
respective numbers. To give an impression of the understatement of the regular measure of unemployment; the 
corresponding figures of unemployed receiving benefits were 50 800 and 465 100 (Jackson, 1985, p. 30). The right to 
unemployment benefits for a limited period of time was highly exclusive, among the requirements were: being poor, 
belongingness to the same local area and occupation for years, and involuntary unemployed. 
61 High unemployment has been a concern in France for almost 30 years.  
62 A labor market separating employment contracts into temporary and permanent is called a dual labor market. The 
issue of temporary contracts if further discussed in section 5. 
63 The proportion of inactive youth is heavily skewed, 85% of the NEET’s did not study beyond secondary schooling. 
The recession has reinforced the inequality of employment between those with and without higher education. 
64 This proposed reform is called Contrat de Travail Unique (CTU), and it was first proposed in 2007 (Casale & Perulli, 
2014, pp.56-62). 
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3.4 Spain   
Today’s situation in Spain today is 
heavily contrasting the situation during 
the Great Depression. The depression 
in Spain was less severe than in most 
European countries.65 There were both 
internal and external factors 
contributing to the economic decline of 
the 1930s. The domestic situation was 
likely as important as the international 
turbulence, and may even be the 
primary cause of the economic 
downturn. Under the Miguel Primo de 
Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930), Spain 
went through a period of expansive 
public spending. This included massive infrastructure programs, which, similarly to now, 
were incompatible with a balanced budget, and were funded by public loans. During 
these years there was an increase in inflation and a sharp decrease in unemployment as 
these public reforms increased labor demand. Primo de Rivera also raised the influential 
power of the labor force by appointing government arbitrators to dispute over wages. 
The economic boom ended in 1929 with a bad harvest, a weakened currency, and the 
resignation from Primo de Rivera (Payne, 1993).  
The Great Recession, on the other hand, has hit the Spanish economy particularly hard.66 
The illustration of the evolution of GDP in figure 16 displays the contrasting experience 
of the two crises. The Spanish economy needed seven years to reach the pre-crisis GDP 
level during the depression. Today, reaching the pre-crisis GDP level is distant, but the 
outlook is becoming increasingly positive. Domestic demand has strengthened due to 
easier financing conditions, enhanced confidence and low oil prices. The European 
Commission expects growth to double from 1.4% in 2014 to 2.8% in 2015.  
In the wake of the crisis, there has been strong agreement among professionals in the 
field of economics related to Spain’s imbalance between savings and debt. The presence 
of large imbalances in debt and savings during their booming decade largely stimulated 
the economic meltdown. The massive housing bubble and GDP growth were largely 
caused by relaxing the governmental supervision of the financial sector.67 Furthermore, 
during the decade of fiscal irresponsibility, dependence on unsustainably high 
government expenditure was cultivated. This prosperous image was artificial, and when 
the housing bubble burst, 50% of jobs in the construction sector were lost within three 
                                                          
65 As mentioned in the third section, data on the Spanish depression is highly incomplete. The data available from the 
depression years are collected by the Spanish statistical office; INE, and can be found in their historical yearbooks. 
66 Other countries of in the “sinful periphery” were heavily affected by the crisis (Estrada, Galí, & López-Salido, 2012).  
67 Residential property prices in Spain increased by 200% between 1996 and 2007.  
Figure 16 – This comparison display the relatively equal 
emergence of crisis, but the Great Recession’s persistance has 
been much stronger. 
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Years since crisis 
GDP response - Spain 
1929 2008
Fernanda Winger Eggen 
22 
 
years. As a consequence property prices plummeted, and there are now around 3.4 
million homes vacant in Spain.68  
The fall in industrial production as a 
consequence of the Great Depression 
was milder, both, compared with other 
countries and compared to the 
situation today. One of the main 
reasons behind this was the relatively 
small industrial sector in Spain. In the 
1930s, half of the male population was 
still employed in agriculture, and 
productivity levels were much lower 
than in most industrialized countries 
(Simpson, 1997).69 The illustration of 
industrial production ends in 1933, 
because no official statistics where 
collected during the Civil War. 
The impact of the international 
recession were dampened by the 
flexible exchange rate, relatively small 
volumes of international trade, and the 
protectionist policies adopted in the 
1920s (Giménez & Montero, 2012).70 
Furthermore, Spain was not harmed by 
the bankruptcy of American banks, as 
they did not have any foreign loans; 
rather they had excess savings and 
large gold reserves. The main effect of 
the depression on Spain was through 
trade. International trade collapsed, 
both in the current crisis and during the Great Depression. However, the plummet in 
global trade as a consequence of the depression, was worsened by implementation of 
protectionist trade policies (Eichengreen & Irwin, 1993; Crucini & Kahn, 1996).71 The 
severe drop in Spanish exports, illustrated by figure 18, was largely a consequence of 
                                                          
68 The corresponding numbers in Germany, France and the UK are 1.8m, 2m and 0.7m homes respectively. In Europe 
as a whole it is estimated that more than 11 million homes are vacant (Neate, 2014). 
69 Patrick O’Brien and Leanardo Prados de La Escosura (1992)report that the labor productivity in Spain was only 44% 
and 39% of the levels in France and the UK respectfully in their chapter on agricultural productivity and European 
industrialization, 1890-1980 published in the 45th volume of the Economic History Review.  
70 Spain was the only European country who did not return to the gold standard in the 1920s, and several authors, 
including Kochin, Choudhri, Bernanke and Fisher, argue that this is the main reason why Spain to a large extent 
escaped the depression (Choudhri & Kochin, 1980). 
71 The first trade restriction imposed as a response to the depression was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff adopted by the US. 
In the current crisis there has been no enhancement of protectionist policies, arguably because policy makers have 
learned from the past. 
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Export response - the Great Depression 
Figure 18 – There was a massive drop in export demand as a 
concequence of the Great Depression. 
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Figure 17 – This comparison of industrial production in Spain 
clairly display that there is still a long way back to their pre 
crisis level in 2008. The impcat is also much larger today, 
compared with in the 1930s. Ending January 2015 and 
December 1933. 
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their main trading partners establishing tariffs on their imports (e.g. onions, cork, 
oranges and grapes), while Spain’s protectionist policies were relatively mild.72 This 
contributed to a reduction of the terms of trade (Giménez & Montero, 2012). INE (1936) 
reports that the trade balance also weakened because Spain’s exports mainly consisted 
of agricultural goods, whereas imports consisted of raw materials which were difficult to 
produce domestically (e.g. cotton). The period that followed was characterized by 
economic crisis and political instability, and eventually ended with the Spanish civil war.  
The reduction in exports during the 
Great Recession was also extreme. 
Spain’s exports involve mainly ships, 
cars, pharmaceuticals and electronics. 
The recession in Europe affected them 
heavily as most of their international 
trade is with other European countries. 
However, there have been several 
reforms implemented in Spain, aiming 
at reducing labor costs. The idea was 
that this would raise international 
competitiveness, and contribute to an 
export-led recovery. There has also 
been a shift in the main importers of 
Spanish goods, towards emerging markets. Figure 19 illustrate that the reform of mid-
2010 and mid-2012 was implemented simultaneously as exports rose. The recent 
decline in exports is presumably caused by the concurrent appreciation of the Euro. 
The severe decline in exports 
contributed to a rise in unemployment. 
There are no official figures of 
unemployment before 1933, or during 
the civil war. This hurdles the 
comparison of the two crises. However, 
there is reason to believe that, although, 
unemployment in Spain was a large 
issue, it was lower than in Germany 
and Britain. The increase in joblessness 
originated from a lower production 
rate, and as a result of migration of 
118 000 people to Spain due to the 
international crisis (Bruno, 2003).73  
                                                          
72 By 1932 every European Country had implemented import quotas or increased tariffs, in an attempt to protect own 
industries.  
73 This is a sharp contrast to the situation today. Eurostat reports a decline in Spanish immigration from 958 266 in 
2007, to 280 772 in 2013. 
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Figure 20 – Number of unemployed individuals in Spain during 
the 1930s. 
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Figure 19 –As most other industialized nations, exports 
plummeted as the crisis commenced, but the shock was more 
transitory than in the 1930s. Mainly because the introduction of 
protectionary policies has been restricted. 
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Spain is currently experiencing the 
highest youth unemployment rate in 
history, including more than half of the 
younger population. The youth 
unemployment rate in Spain has 
historically been high relative to other 
developed countries, but it is now well 
above 20% higher than the historical 
average.74 Moreover, Eurostat reported 
that, in 2014, 77% of part-time 
employees between 25 and 29, claimed 
lack of success in attaining full time 
employment as the main reason for 
their employment status. This is a major increase, from 39% in 2007. Immigrants were 
also heavily impacted. The reason was first and foremost because job losses were 
concentrated in sectors employing a relatively high number of foreigners. In addition, 
the state offered bonuses to non-EU immigrants who agreed to leave Spain for three 
years, in an attempt to relieve the strain upon domestic labor (Beets & Willekens, 2009). 
 
As the 6th largest economy in Europe these figures are truly dangerous, and the severity 
does not seem to diminish in the near future. A major reason why the Spanish labor 
market has been so heavily affected is the high degree of labor market duality and wage 
rigidity (Dolado, 2015). Furthermore, during their recent boom years there was a 
tendency of concentration of investments in the currently most distressed industries. 
Fortunately, the most recent figures suggest that Spain does display signs of recovery.  
3.5 Summary of the Descriptive Empirics 
This section has provided an illustrative outline of the crises impact on key economic 
indicators in the four selected countries. It is clear that the contagion of the current 
crisis display a different pattern. During the depression, Germany was the major source 
of the epidemic. Whereas today, Germany was relatively less damaged, and arguably 
function as a key piece in puzzle of improving the European situation. On the other side 
is Spain, who’s situation today resemblances that of Germany during the depression. 
Although major differences between these countries exist, statistics indicate that most 
variables demonstrated higher persistence as a consequence of the Great Depression, 
relative to the Great Recession. Furthermore, the global shock of 2008 affected variables 
more immediately, possibly due to the stronger interconnectedness of the world today 
compared with in the 1930s. 
Motivated by the high persistence of the depressing unemployment rates, relatively to 
other leading economic indicators, the next section seek to analyze whether this, 
originally cyclical shock, has contributed to structural changes. 
                                                          
74 Their record low is 17.40% for youth unemployment and 10% total unemployment, these figures occurred in the 
year before the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
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Figure 21 – The unemployment rate in Spain is still significantly 
more than twice what it was when the crisis commenced. The 
ending month is January 2015. 
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4 Beveridge Curves  
There have been gradual structural changes in the labor market throughout the world in 
the past decades. The world has experienced stronger globalization and a rise of 
technological advances when entering “the information age”. Across the globe, the 
characteristic of labor demand changing, the need for lower- and medium-skilled 
workers has been declining, whereas the demand for high skilled labor is increasing. 
Particularly in advanced economies, increased technology and productivity has reduced 
the demand for lower- and medium-skilled workers as their responsibilities have, to a 
large extent, been automatized or outsourced to lower-cost locations (Brynjolfsson & 
McAfee, 2012, pp. 25-33). It is possible that the Great Recession, as the Great Depression, 
will act as a catalyst, accelerating the trend of labor market mismatch (Dobbs, et al., 
2012).75 This section will commence by outlining a simple theoretical framework 
underlying the Beveridge curve, based on a paper by Pissarides (2013).76 The preceding 
subsections will analyze the Beveridge curve of the four selected countries separately, 
aiming at shedding light on each nation’s labor market situation. I will only consider the 
Great Recession due to lack of reliable data from the depression years.77  
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
The global recession and Sovereign debt crisis has led to massive labor market 
distortion in Europe. This section will analyze the change in the relationship between 
job vacancies and unemployment.78 In other words, it outlines the match between 
supply and demand in the labor market. Since 2007 there has been an overall reduction 
in vacancies and a major increase in unemployment across Europe, mainly due to falling 
employment (Estrada, Galí, & López-Salido, 2012).79 The Beveridge curve, or UV-curve, 
illustrates the empirically negative relationship between unemployed workers and firms 
demand for labor as a matching function. The matching function, 𝑀 = 𝑀(𝑢, 𝑣), describes 
the efficiency in matching unemployed workers (𝑈) with vacant positions (𝑉).80  
The theory of search and matching can be applied to explain the rationale behind this 
relationship. The theoretical framework is based on the reallocation of labor in response 
to factors influencing the firm’s profitability, and the efficiency of the matching process. 
Assume that the separation rate is given by 𝜆, and depends on aggregate and structural 
changes. The probability of moving into employment is given by 𝜌, and depends on the 
unemployment rate and the vacancy rate, 𝜌(𝑣/𝑢).81 The intuitive prediction is that the 
                                                          
75 Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu (2012) find that the movement away from routine work is not a gradual phenomenon; 
rather 88% of these job losses occur during a recession.  
76 A detailed description of the theoretical framework can be found in Pissarides (2000). 
77 During the Great Depression, structural changes in terms of technological advances were a major reason for 
structural changes in the labor market (Keynes, 1932). 
78 In this section total unemployment will be used instead of youth unemployment because there are no separate 
vacancy rates for the younger generation.  
79 As opposed to a reduction in the participation rate, that has played a smaller role in raising unemployment. This is 
the rational for utilizing the simplifying assumption about the outflow from unemployment being solely a result of 
succeeding in finding employment used in the theoretical model. This is, arguably, a weakness because the increasing 
number of unemployed having been discouraged are an important characteristic of the Great Recession. 
80 The matching function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, concave and homogenous of degree 1 
(Pissarides, 2000, pp. 6). Lowercase letters indicate the rate of the arguments, whereas uppercase letters is the level. 
81 s and 𝜌 are averages at the macro level. The labor force is assumed constant for simplicity.  
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probability of moving from being unemployed to employed, increases in the number of 
job vacancies, 𝑣/𝑢, hence 𝜌′(𝑣/𝑢) > 0. This ratio is known for measuring the labor 
market tightness, and is typically low during a recession.  
The number of individuals moving from employment to unemployment, given by 
(1 − 𝑢)𝜆, and the number moving from unemployment to employment is given by 𝑢𝜌. 
An equation for the unemployment rate can be obtained under the flow-equilibrium 
condition, stating that the flow into unemployment equals the flow out of 
unemployment in steady state. 
(1)           (1 − 𝑢)𝜆 = 𝑢𝜌 
 
(2)            𝑢 =
𝜆
𝜌+𝜆
,      𝑢𝜆
′ > 0,       𝑢𝜌
′ < 0  
We will, at any point in time, have a degree of labor market slack, because there will 
always exist employees and employers searching for each other. However, in 
recessionary times these matching frictions will be amplified. This simple framework 
can be utilized to analyze the evolution of labor market dynamics over the timespan of a 
recession. As the economy slows down, the average probability of job separation 
increases temporarily (𝜆). Furthermore, economic downturns result in reduced job 
creation, therefore the average probability of obtaining employment will also 
decrease (𝜌). Historically, the tendency was been that the increase in 𝜆 is transitory, as 
employers complete their downsizing relatively rapid. However, the slack in job creation 
remains sluggish for an extended period. This is evident in the empirical analysis of the 
Great Recession below.  
The Beveridge Curve can be drawn by 
exploiting equation (2), and can be used to 
distinguish between two of Keynes’ three 
types of unemployment. Graphically, this 
will be presented as in figure 22, by plotting 
the job vacancy rate (𝑣) against the 
unemployment rate (𝑢). The illustration 
generates the possibility to determine 
whether the change in the labor market is 
structural or cyclical (Elsby, Michaels, & 
Ratner, 2014). Below is a description of the 
three categories of unemployment, utilizing 
figure 22 and the theoretical framework 
provided above. 
Cyclical unemployment is the first of Keynes’ explanations for unemployment. It refers 
to the component of overall unemployment that follows the business cycle. A fall in 
aggregate demand typically leads a reduction of posted vacancies followed by higher 
cyclical unemployment that will abate as demand recovers. Across the countries 
analyzed in this paper this structure is present, and is illustrated as a movement along 
Figure 22 - Overview of the four labor market situations 
explained by the Beveridge curve. 
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the curve in figure 22. Shortly after the crisis commenced in 2008, there was a sharp fall 
in vacancies followed by an increase in unemployment present in the four selected 
countries.82  
The second explanation is structural unemployment, which is a consequence of long-
term skill mismatch between the laborers demanded and supplied. A period of 
prolonged deficient demand could cause specific industries to perish, leaving their 
specialized workers unattractive in the labor market. Furthermore, the skillset and 
confidence of these workers will deprive over time. This can be illustrated by an 
outward shift in the Beveridge curve. In the Great Depression persistent cyclical 
unemployment developed into a permanently higher unemployment for a significant 
part of the labor force, and the same is at risk of happening today (Jensen, 1998). Higher 
structural unemployment will imply a permanent waste of human capabilities, and 
massive negative externalities on various parts of the economy. 
The final type of unemployment is not explained by the Beveridge curve. Frictional 
unemployment relates to the time spent job searching. Both during the Great Depression 
and now, it has been observed that workers are more reluctant to quitting, and the 
youth remain in education longer. This has caused a temporary decrease in frictional 
unemployment (Mattila, 1974). 
Figure 22 depicts the four areas which the Beveridge curve can be separated into, 
indicating four different labor market situations. The top right corner is an area of high 
unemployment and abundance of job vacancies. It can be reached if a shock is very 
persistent, and therefore leads to structural changes in the economy. A change in labor 
market trends typically shifts the curve, and is caused by institutional changes, 
technological advancement, changes in sectoral composition or demography (Blanchard 
& Diamond, 1989). In the presence of structural changes in the labor market, the role of 
intervention becomes much more complex. The situation causes a long term mismatch 
of the skills of workers and the demand for them. According to the European 
Commission (2013), there are currently more than 2 million unfilled job vacancies in the 
EU. High priority must be placed on hindering the trend of countries moving to this area 
of the figure, as well as guiding those already in this situation out of it.  The bottom right 
corner is the area of high unemployment and few vacant positions. This is a symptom of 
an economy in recession, where firms are reluctant to hire due to economic hardship. 
The result is higher cyclical unemployment. The top left corner of the figure is an area of 
labor shortage, where the unemployment rate is low and there is a surplus of vacancies. 
This occurs, typically, in during a period of economic expansion. The final corner of the 
Beveridge curve is the bottom left, which indicates that the economy is in a situation of 
great matching efficiency. Both the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate are low.    
 
                                                          
82 The increase in unemployment in Germany was very short and followed by a significant decrease over the following 
years. 
Fernanda Winger Eggen 
28 
 
4.2 The German Beveridge Curve 
The German economy finds itself 
in the top left corner indicating, 
that they may be experiencing 
labor shortage. There is no sign of 
recession; rather there is low 
unemployment and a high 
number of job vacancies. This has 
been the situation since 2011, and 
can be seen as a light amongst the 
depressed labor markets of 
Europe. The German labor 
shortage has contributed to 
improve the situation of other 
countries, through a massive 
increase in labor immigrants since 
2009. It has also been highly 
beneficial for Germany, who has 
experienced a decline in cohort sizes and a lack of skilled workers (Dolado, 2015). 
Furthermore, this decline has contributed to keeping the unemployment rate low. 
In contrast with the rest of the Eurozone, there has been an improvement in the labor 
market in Germany, and possibly a decline in structural unemployment. The German 
labor market framework deviates from that of other countries, and is based on a 
collective partnership between the state, business and trade unions (Krause, Rinne, & 
Zimmermann, 2014).83 Germany went through a much needed structural labor market 
change prior to the crisis, and the resulting increased labor market robustness 
contributed to the relatively mild recession. There has been a shift inward since the 
recession commenced, implying that for a given number for job vacancies the 
unemployment rate is lower than before. This can be a sign of improved matching 
efficiency between the supply and demand of labor, which was the goal of the Hartz 
reforms implemented between 2003 and 2005. It is argued by Klinger and Weber (2012) 
that the reforms were the main reason for the outstanding upturn in matching efficiency. 
The reform involved four stages, where the three first aimed at creating new types of job 
opportunities, introducing additional wage subsidies and restructuring the Federal 
Employment Agency towards increased transparency.84 The final stage involved a cut 
and restriction on unemployment benefits for the long run unemployed, aiming at 
increasing the search incentive. This stage has been largely unpopular in Germany as the 
                                                          
83 This contrasts to the more regulatory approach used in France, and the market based approach in the UK. 
84 Mini-job and Midi-job are two new “types” of jobs. The mini-job refers to a contract which does not typically pay 
more than €450 a month, the employers pay 31% in tax and social insurance contribution and the employee is liable 
for their own pension insurance. The midi-job refers to contracts paying an average monthly salary of €450-€850, 
where the employees pay a reduced rate of social insurance and the employers pay a contribution rate below that of 
mini-jobs. These jobs are in addition to regular employment, fixed-term contracts and temporary employment aimed 
at fostering flexible employment solutions. Source: Germany Trade & Invest 
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Figure 23 – The German labor market display a shortage of labor, and 
during the past seven years there is a clear inward shift in the curve. 
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long term unemployment benefits were reduced. It indicates that, despite the fact that 
the median household gained from the reform, due to reduced tax payments to a lower 
social security, households preferred the security of long term unemployment benefits 
(Krebs & Scheffel, 2013).  
Germany has also implemented a strong vocational training system of three tracks; 
apprenticeships that combine formal vocational schooling with practical working 
experience, full-time vocational schooling and a training track for those not qualified for 
apprenticeship. The content of the program is constantly adapted to the labor market’s 
changing demand, and it has proven to be highly effective in reducing unemployment, 
especially by easing the transition from school to work. The vocational training 
framework crucially depends upon collaboration between employers, the government 
and trade unions (Krause et al., 2014).85 These reforms will be discussed further in 
section 6.  
The Beveridge curve illustrate that, 
since the reform was implemented, the 
trend has mainly been towards a 
tightening of the labor market; falling 
unemployment and increasing job 
vacancies.86 The exception to this trend 
was the short adverse effect on the 
labor market as a consequence of the 
international crisis. From figure 23, it is 
clear that there was an immediate 
negative effect on vacancies, followed 
by a slight increase in unemployment. 
When comparing the years before and 
after the reforms, there was actually a shift outward in the curve. A shift can also 
indicate changes in labor supply, and an increase in labor supply did occur in this period, 
as the participation rate increased from 56% to 60% of total population (Haincourt & 
Mogliani, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
85 Trade unions agreement is needed, as the income related to an apprenticeship is below standard contracts. The 
government will provide funding for the teaching at schools, whereas firms bear the training cost.  
86 The increase in unemployment in 2005 is mainly due to changes in defining unemployed. The unemployment status 
expanded to include those who had previously received welfare benefits and is currently not working. Before the 
Hertz reforms, those not registered as unemployed would not be considered as unemployed (Riphahn, 2015). 
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4.3 The United Kingdom’s Beveridge Curve 
The British curve depicts an 
outward shift, and they are now 
in a situation with relative 
abundance of vacancies. For the 
same vacancy rate, 
unemployment is now greater 
than the before the recession. As 
explained above, this shift can be 
a sign of increased long-term 
unemployment, and structural 
change, causing reduced 
matching efficiency.87 An outward 
shift can be a consequence of 
recession, and is often referred to 
as hysteresis.88 Employees laid off 
during a recession often 
experience difficulty being 
reemployed, and will therefore lose their skills and motivation. The longer the recession, 
the higher becomes the probability that there will become long term unemployment 
(Haincourt & Mogliani, 2012).  
During the period between 2001 and 2007, the unemployment rate remained close to 
5%, and the vacancy rate remained relatively stable. Between the 1980s and 2000s, the 
UK implemented institutional reforms improving the labor market. The reforms 
included stricter unemployment rules, tax reductions and increased labor market 
flexibility (Pissarides, 2013, pp. 395).  
The UK experienced an increase in cyclical labor market slack, as the recession 
commenced. This was largely contributed, as in Spain and the US, by the 
disproportionate decline in employment in the construction sector, heavily affected by 
falling house prices and demand (Hobijn & Sahin, 2013). These workers are typically 
low-skilled and/or young.  In addition to increased unemployment, there has been a 
decrease in productivity and real wages since 2008. This fall has been so significant that 
the real wage of autumn 2013 equaled the real wage of 2003 (UKCES, 2014, pp. 57). 
However, the trend has recently turned, as the severe fall in oil prices since the summer 
of 2014 has contributed to increased real income. The record low inflation is expected to 
result in the first increase in real wages since the recession commenced (ICAEW, 2015).  
                                                          
87 According to Eurostat, long term unemployment (more than one year) doubled from 2008 to 2010, reaching 2.8% 
of the active population in 2012. Since then we have seen a steady decline, and in March 2015 the long term rate was 
2.1%. The increase in long term unemployment, as a share of the unemployed, increased from 23% in 2007 to 35% in 
2014. The corresponding numbers for long term youth unemployment is approximately 15% in 2007 to 27.5% in 
2014. 
88 Hysteresis in unemployment refers to cases where the steady state equilibrium unemployment is path dependent. 
This indicates that permanently high unemployment after adverse shocks to the economy can have an effect on 
equilibrium unemployment (Blanchard & Summers, 1987). 
Figure 25 – The British Beveridge curve display a clear outward shift as 
a consequence of the Great Recession, commencing in 2011. 
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Figure 26 – The French Beveridge curve display a transition from the 
corner of labor shortage to a situation of labor surplus caused by the 
recession. 
Since 2011, there has been an increase in vacancies and a reduction in unemployment. 
This positive trend was contributed by the introduction of several policies discussed in 
section 6.89 Unemployment and vacancies are now closely aligned with the situation in 
2007. However, numerous workers have become discouraged by continuous rejection, 
and there has been a significant increase of underemployment, which does not have an 
impact on the unemployment statistics. The composition of the workforce is not what 
employers demand; also the matching efficiency between those workers who possess 
the desired skills and employers is not optimal. The long term structural change 
expected to occur in the UK, as well as other industrial countries, is a polarizing of high- 
and low-skilled occupations, and a massive surplus of undesirable middle-skill labor 
(UKCES, 2014).  
4.4 The French Beveridge Curve  
As of the third quarter of 2014, 
France found themselves in the 
corner of recession or labor 
surplus. France is experiencing 
high unemployment and a low 
number of job vacancies. 
Unemployment has been above  
10% since the end of 2012, which 
is the highest rate since they 
implemented the Euro.  
The evolution of the French 
Beveridge curve is possibly less 
clear compared to the other 
countries, as the curve reveals 
several labor market disruptions 
during the last 15 years. However, 
when comparing the years before 
and after 2009, the presence of an outward shift is clear. The curve also exhibits a 
further worsening of the labor market situation in 2011, as illustrated in figure 26.  
The history of the years analyzed is as follows: In February 2000, France implemented 
the first of the Aubry Acts. This meant introducing a 35-hour workweek. The goal of this 
implementation was to reduce unemployment by improving the division of labor, and to 
take advantage of the improvements in productivity by freeing time for leisure.90 This 
                                                          
89 Including Universal Credit, Job Seekers Allowance and Future Job Fund. 
90 The rationale for believing that firms will hire more workers if each employee work less hours is based on the 
assumption that firm production is fixed, which can be regarded as a false premise. An additional assumption that 
must hold is that workers are perfect substitutes (only wage affect labor demand) and wages per hour is constant. In 
this act monthly wages is constant, and in reality firms also face costs associated with hiring making them reluctant to 
hire. 
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was to be done without any losses imposed on the employees.91 In other words, the 
income of the workers should not alter significantly, which implies that it would be more 
costly for firms to produce. However, it was argued that the increased productivity 
would make up for much of the reduction in hours. The acts also gave firms, especially 
small firms, a soft transition into the new workweek.92 In addition, all firms signing 35-
hour workweek contracts with unions received social security rebates.  Taking these 
benefits into account, it was claimed by French authorities that firms would not face 
higher labor costs, possibly even lower (Estevão & Sá, 2008).  
In the two years following this implementation, the Beveridge curve displays a reduction 
in unemployment, but a failure to increase job vacancies. With the loss of the socialist 
government in 2002, the laws where gradually weakened until 2005.  In this period, 
both unemployment and vacancies increased. Estevão and Sá (2008) conclude their 
paper by rejecting the work-sharing hypothesis; they find no effect on employment after 
implementation of these acts.93 
As an immediate response to the Great Recession, the curve depicts a decline in 
vacancies, followed by an increase in unemployment. The outward shift in the curve, 
completed in 2011, indicates decreased matching efficiency in the labor market. A report 
by McKinsey Global Institute (2012) claims that France is indeed experiencing a severe 
mismatch between the supply of, and demand for, labor. The presence of this trend 
existed before the recession commenced, but the crisis seems to have caused this 
evolution to accelerate. The report further explains that the mismatch stems from the 
strong demand for high-skilled labor and abundance of low-skilled workers. It is 
suggested that the overall level of skills must be adapted to meet market demand, and 
also adapted to international standards.  
The mismatch in the labor market has been increasing over the past 15 years, as we 
have seen a wave of automatizing and standardizing routine work, replacing workers 
with low and medium skill levels of technology. The French educational system is 
encountering large difficulties in meeting the rapid changes in labor demand due to 
technological advancement (Labaye et al., 2012, pp. 20).  
 
 
 
                                                          
91 Aubry II introduced rules of correct implementation of the act, including not significantly altering monthly labor 
income. Arguably a flaw to this rule is that it did only apply to employees earning minimum wage (the social security 
rebates were also most beneficial for employees earning a minimum wage).  
92 A firm was considered small by the Aubry act if it employed less than 20. Small firms would experience more 
difficulties transforming into the new laws, and therefore they received a reduction in overtime premium and the limit 
to yearly overtime per firm. 
93 However, dual-job holdings increased for men, which indicate that the extra hours of leisure received after the 
reform was often used to work. This will give no productivity gain to the main employer. Furthermore, firms were 
more inclined to let go of their more expensive workers (men), replacing them with cheaper labor, causing no 
aggregate effect in employment, but a change in the labor force composition (the same result holds for Germany). 
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4.5 The Spanish Beveridge Curve  
The labor market situation in 
Spain is by far the darkest of the 
countries compared in this thesis. 
Unemployment is still alarmingly 
high, and ambition of returning to 
their relatively prosperous 
situation in 2007 if fading. The 
increase in long term 
unemployment, as a share of the 
unemployed, increased from 20% 
in 2007 to 53% in 2014. The 
corresponding numbers for long 
term youth unemployment is 10% 
in 2007 and 40% in 2014. This 
intense increase provides an 
indication of the persistence of 
the labor market slack. The 
plummet in employment is 
disproportionately affecting the youth and workers employed in the construction sector. 
Reasons behind the skewed distribution of unemployment are lack of aggregate demand 
and vocational training, as well as the segmentation of the labor market (Garcia-Serrano 
& Malo, 2013). Spain has been the largest driver of EU unemployment, contributing with 
40% of the increase in the period 2009-2012.94  
The Spanish Beveridge curve depicts a less ambiguous relationship than the French.95 
The country experienced steady employment growth from the 1990s to 2007. The 
period of growth was contributed by a large increase in the labor force and 
implementation of more flexible temporary contracts. Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le 
Barbanchon (2010) found that the increase stemmed from immigration (typically low-
skilled employed in the booming industries), a 1% of population growth each year, and 
increased female labor market participation. After more than a decade of falling 
unemployment, increasing vacancies and rising GDP, the Spanish economy collapsed 
with a massive housing bubble. Vacancies started to fall already in 2007, continuing to 
drop until the end of 2008. In 2009, job vacancies remained stable, but unemployment 
rose sharply. The dual nature of the Spanish labor market makes it easy for employers to 
choose not to renew temporary contracts, this drove up cyclical layoffs (Pissarides, 2013, 
pp. 401). Since then there have been few encouragements, and the Beveridge curve 
illustrate a continuous downwards sliding trend until the end of 2013. Since 2014, the 
                                                          
94 Total unemployment has declined for three successive months for the first time since 2008. Youth unemployment 
was declining, but experienced a 1% increase in the 4th quarter of 2014. The second largest contributor to 
unemployment is close to 10%, and includes France, Italy and Greece.  
95 Often comparisons are made between France and Spain because they started at seemingly equal labor situations, in 
terms of vacancies, labor market institutions and unemployment rates. 
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Figure 27 – The Spanish Beveridge curve display few highlights since 
the Great Recession hit their labor market. The first increase in 
vacancies since 2007 was experienced in 2014.  
Fernanda Winger Eggen 
34 
 
labor market exhibits improvements in terms of both lower unemployment and a higher 
number of job vacancies.           
In 2012, Spain (under the Rajoy administration) initiated a labor reform similar to the 
German Hartz reform. The objective of the reform included raising Spain’s 
competitiveness by reducing the cost of labor, as well as reducing the rigidity of the 
employment protection legislation, an internal devaluation.96 The importance of raising 
competitiveness is driven by the prolonged internal reduction in demand (Bentolila, 
Dolado, & Jimeno, 2012). Rajoy argued that growth should be attained from other 
countries through exports, and deprived of the possibility of devaluing the currency, 
increased competitiveness could be realized by reducing product prices through 
lowering labor costs. From figure 19 we saw that exports did indeed increase after these 
reforms. 
The lack of sectoral labor mobility in Spain contributes to possible increases in 
structural unemployment. The highly labor intensive construction sector was 
disproportionately hit by the recession. The sector felt a drop in employment of close to 
50% between 2009 and 2012 (European Commission, 2013, pp. 22). After a decade of 
high growth, the housing bubble in Spain burst, and 35% of unskilled positions in the 
construction industry were lost. The investment boom in the construction sector was 
fuelled by the relatively high inflation rate when adopting the Euro, which led to a 6% 
fall in real interest rates, and a relative abundance of unskilled labor (Bentolila et al., 
2010). The high unemployment in the construction sector seems to be highly persistent. 
Reasons for this belief include the stubbornly high net supply of housing, as well as the 
lack of important adjustment mechanisms to combat the crisis (Fingleton, Garretsen, & 
Martin, 2015).97 Additionally, the low-skilled workers are experiencing difficulties 
reallocating to other industries (Haincourt & Mogliani, 2012, pp. 77). There is a major 
need for sectoral rebalancing to generate alternative job opportunities for the, likely, 
irreversible job losses in the construction sector (Bonthuis et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 Making the employment protection legislation more business friendly included for example the possibility of 
dismissal of workers by companies facing three successive quarters of declining revenues. 
97 These mechanisms include strong labor market rigidity and low tendency of labor migration, which will be 
discussed further in section 5 and 6. 
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4.6 Summary of the Beveridge Curve Analysis 
The analysis presented in this section is simple, and it is too soon to draw any significant 
conclusions about the structural changes in the labor market. However, of the countries 
analyzed, there is an evident outward shift in the Beveridge curve of the United Kingdom 
and France. Germany has experienced an inward shift as a result of the rewarding 
reforms earlier in the decade. That Germany has succeeded in increasing matching 
efficiency is evident from figure 23. Furthermore, there has been a significant decline in 
individuals reporting that their main reason for being part-time employed is lack of full-
time opportunities, from 27.6% in 2007 to only 16.5% in 2014. The Spanish curve 
reveals a possible initiation of an outward shift. It is realistic to believe that the 
divergence in the European labor market is not temporary, but that we have entered a 
period of structural change.98 The prolonged adjustment process is amplified by weak 
labor mobility, and labor market rigidities not allowing wages to fall to the extent 
necessary to mend the gap between supply of and demand for labor (Fingleton et al., 
2015). The cyclical effect of the recession has disproportionally hit the lower skilled 
workers. However, the structural change is believed to be borne mainly by the middle 
skilled, as technological advancement increasingly automatizes the need for these 
professions. This indicates that, similarly to during the depression, a polarization 
towards the lower and higher skilled occupations are underway.99  
The information provided in this section indicates that the changes in the labor market 
are not transitory. Therefore, it is immensely important to adapt the educational and 
training system in such a way that the youth can provide skills demanded by the labor 
market. Before analyzing policy options, the next section provide an outline of the 
recession’s consequences faced by the European youth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
98 Only one quarter of the respondents to the IZA Expert Opinion Survey think that the divergence experienced in 
Europe after the recession commenced is transitional, whereas 60% believe that it will be long lasting (Krause et al., 
2014). This is a survey conducted on the Single European Labor Market in 2014. The 284 respondents were all among 
the prominent IZA Research and Policy Fellows. 
99 “We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which 
they will hear a great deal in the years to come—namely, technological unemployment. This means unemployment 
due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for 
labour.” From the essay Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren (Keynes, 1932) 
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5 The Lost Generation 
One of the most severe consequences of the labor market slack caused by the recession 
is youth unemployment. Joblessness of young people is becoming an endemic feature of 
modern economics. Unemployed youth are in danger of never developing the customs 
and mindset necessary to acquire stable employment if their time on the sideline of the 
labor market is extensive (Eichengreen, 1987). This is one consequence of the crisis that 
is more severe today than during the Great Depression, and a true recovery remains to 
be seen. The young are affected disproportionately by the crisis compared to the general 
population, and have been for several decades (Bell & Blanchflower, 2010). There are 
currently close to 24 million unemployed people in EU, where 4.85 million of the EU’s 
youth is standing outside of the labor market (Eurostat, 2015). Furthermore, 12.4% and 
20.3% of the age groups 15-24, and 25-29, respectively, are neither enrolled in any form 
of education nor training (NEET). Additionally, a third of the unemployed youth has 
been so for more than 12 months (Felgueroso & Jansen, 2015).  
 There are several reasons why the situation of the young are significantly deteriorated 
in times of economic downturns, and why youth unemployment in general tend to be 
higher than total unemployment. Among the main reasons on the demand side, we find 
that employers often prefer more experienced applicants, and as the youth tend to 
possess less human capital they will be dismissed first in times of economic hardship. 
This indicates that young people might find themselves trapped. They will not be 
employed due to lack of experience, but have no option to attain the required experience. 
On the supply side, we find that the young have less significant responsibilities than 
adults, which can give an incentive to restrict their job search activity. Moreover, there is 
higher worker turnover amongst youth because the chance of getting their dream job 
when young and inexperienced is low (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011).  
This section will provide an overview of the youth demography; opening with the 
historic evolution, before analyzing the characteristics of today.  
Figure 28 - Both graphs indicate the labor market situation faced by the young has still not returned to the pre-crisis level 
for most countries, except for in Germany. The NEET rates experienced a significant drop between 2012 and 2014, and 
the UK was able to return to the rate of 2007. This improvement originated from a general economic improvement in the 
EU, and the policy initiatives discussed in section 6. Source: Eurostat. 
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5.1 History of Youth Unemployment 
The issue of youth unemployment was not placed on the agenda until the 1970s, when 
the most industrialized countries experienced a massive increase in labor supply as the 
baby boomers entered the labor force. At the time it was believed that the labor market 
conditions for the young would improve as the cohort size declined, but instead it 
worsened in the 1980s and 1990s (Bell & Blanchflower, 2010). Currently, the situation 
is austere, but it seems to be going in a positive direction for Germany, the UK and 
France. However, the outlook for Spain is more ambiguous. 
During the Great Depression few statistics are available, and the picture is not as clear as 
today. It seems that the unemployment rate was increasing in age for some countries, 
while other have the familiar U-shape with higher unemployment rates among the 
young and the old. The Russian economist Woytinsky (1942) explains this pattern as 
firms’ tendency to fire their least productive laborers in times of economic hardship, the 
least productive being the inexperienced and old. He also concluded that the entrants to 
the labor market would always be disproportionately hit by a recession, and since the 
entrants were mostly the young, youth unemployment, naturally, will be higher than 
total unemployment. That this artefact is not obvious in the data can partly be a 
statistical error as the unemployed youth did usually not qualify for any benefits, and 
would therefore have low incentives to report their status to the government.100  
Eichengreen (1987) has done extensive work on decomposing youth unemployment 
from 1930 to 1970. He found that youth unemployment has become increasingly 
sensitive to business cycle conditions, and that this sensitivity was not apparent earlier 
than the 1930s. He further argues that, similarly to today, the demographic subgroup 
most heavily affected by cyclicality during the depression was young and/or unskilled 
manual workers with low wages; the subgroup least able to afford unemployment. He 
also concludes that the rate of youth unemployment earlier than the 1930s was 
generally lower than the adult rate, due to the reasons already explained.101 I would 
argue that, although, unemployment was a more common issue amongst adults, the 
labor market offered to the youth were not, necessarily, more attractive than the 
situation today. The nature of positions typically employed by the youth offered no 
prospects of adult employment; rather it reduced the possibilities (Burgess, 1998, pp. 
138).102  
Two issues of high importance, both today and during the Great Depression, are the 
duration of unemployment and the reduction of hours for the employed. For example in 
the UK; from 1929 to 1936 those registered as unemployed for more than one year 
increased from 4.7% to 25% of the total unemployed (Eichengreen & Hatton, 1988), and 
the increase from 2008 to 2013 was from 24,1% to 36,2% (Eurostat, 2014). Several 
                                                          
100 Even today this is a reason for believing that youth unemployment is understated to a higher degree than adult 
unemployment.  
101 See page 16. 
102 Reduced possibilities because the work was exhausting on both the mind and the body, it offered no promotion 
opportunities, and did not provide any necessary skills for permanent adult employment. 
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studies conclude that an extended period of unemployment, particularly when young, 
can significantly depress lifetime income.103 Reasons for this typically include that they 
will be forced to take positions below their qualification level or that employers will 
become reluctant to hire those deprived of experience. This does not only harm the 
youth and long run economic growth, but also the baby boom generation in need of 
productive youth to fund their retirement.104 In addition to the general reasons for high 
cyclicality in youth employment, the Great Recession had a more damaging effect on 
industries where the employees were relatively young and commonly on temporary 
contracts (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011, pp. 17). Industries such as manufacturing and 
construction, typically have a relatively large share of young workers, and were also 
disproportionately affected by the crisis. 
5.2 Separating the Young by Educational Attainment 
When separating the young generation into categories of education it is evident which 
category is affected the most by the recession. Elsby, Bobjin, Sahin and Valletta (2011) 
found that the uneducated young people are the main group at risk of experiencing 
unemployment, both in terms of occurrence and duration.105 Research done by the 
OECD in 2005 showed that young individuals, with low human capital and educational 
level, are more exposed to long-term unemployment, social exclusion, as well as low 
quality and unstable job positions (Choudhry, Marelli, & Signorelli, 2012). It has also 
been found that male youth are more vulnerable to unemployment spells because of the 
cyclical component of young male dominated occupations, such as in the industrial 
sector.106 The nature of this crisis was particularly harsh on young and lower-skilled 
male workers, as a result of the extreme plummet in construction demand (Pissarides, 
2013).   
In France, there is also a clear division between the crisis impact and educational level. 
High youth unemployment, especially among those with lower education and from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, has persisted for 30 years, but was exacerbated by the 
crisis. The historically high deviation in unemployment between those with and without 
higher education has intensified since the onset of Great Recession. The need for stable 
employment opportunities, vocational education and job seeking support aimed at this 
group is of high importance (Cahuc & Carcillo, 2015). 
                                                          
103 Kahn (2010) found that those graduating in a depressed economy in the US experience a long-lasting negative 
effect on wages. More precisely, for each percentage-point rise in the unemployment rate, those who graduated 
during the recession earned 6% to 7% less in their first year of employment than their more fortunate counterparts. 
Even 15 years out of school, the recession graduates earned 2.5% less than those who began working in more 
prosperous times. 
104 This is a particularly large problem in Europe as the Pay-as-you-go pension system is practiced. This system 
implies that the benefits received by retirees are funded by the current labor force. Because the baby boom generation 
is relatively numerous relative to the pension fund contributors this is bound to be troublesome, and as the crisis has 
 further reduced the number of contributors this can potentially cause another crisis. 
105 85% of those not employed, in education nor in training in OECD countries have no tertiary education (Carcillo et 
al., 2015). 
106 Traditionally it is found that the service sector have a higher concentration of female workers and display less 
vulnerability to the business cycle, whereas production industries are relatively more abundant in male workers 
(Pissarides, 2013). 
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This picture is shapely contrasting the situation in the 1930s. Based on the few statistics 
I have been able to collect, as well as available literature about this period, it is clear that 
the labor demand has drastically changed. Industries have turned from being highly 
labor-intensive, shifting towards being human-capital intensive.107 During the 
depression, young workers were not disproportionally hit by the downturn to the extent 
of today. In particular, the lower-skilled workers displayed advantageous characteristics 
in terms of better physical shape, lower cost and higher degree of mobility compared to 
older workers. In a study on interwar employment by Burgess (1998, pp. 138), it is 
found that, among the young, those with higher academic qualifications were actually 
least successful in finding employment.108  
During this recession, the growth in youth unemployment has been highest among those 
with tertiary education, but the rate is still considerably lower than for lower-skilled 
workers. The transition from school to work is increasingly difficult as the newly 
educated will be competing with a higher number of experienced workers for fewer 
vacant positions (Scarpetta et al., 2010). In Spain, the rate of employment among those 
finishing tertiary education during the past three years, fell from 87.5% in 2007 to 66% 
in 2013.  
Separating the youth is also of high importance in order to remove a possible 
overestimation of “alarming” youth unemployment. As a reaction to the lowered 
opportunity cost related to the pursuit of higher education, enrollments include an 
increasingly large part of the, otherwise, unemployed youth.109 Figure 28 display the 
NEET rates, which include those below 25 who are not in education, training nor 
employment. This rate is meaningful when evaluating the most harmful consequences of 
the crisis. Policy response should be aimed at reducing the NEET rate. However, the 
escalation of youth unemployment that resulted in an increased number individuals 
extending the years of formal schooling might push forward a necessary change in the 
skill complexion of the labor force, which in turn can foster long term growth.  
5.3 Temporary Contracts 
At least half of all young workers in Spain, France and Germany are employed on 
temporary contracts, while around 20% in the UK (Scarpetta et al., 2010).110 Temporary 
contracts are one of the main reasons why young will suffer disproportionately during 
times of economic hardship. Temporary employees are the easiest to dismiss, and 
countries where a dual-labor market is promoted, commonly display a higher degree of 
volatility in terms on unemployment. Promotion of temporary contracts is a method of 
increasing labor market flexibility by lowering the restrictions related to hiring. 
                                                          
107 This is a general argument, as there were several sectors who displayed both technological innovation and being 
intensive in the usage of skilled labor, such as engineering and chemical industries (Burgess, 1998, pp. 139).  
108 The fact that those least successful in education received the highest paying jobs is a sign of the dominance of the 
“Blind-Alley” positions available, which offered no security and few chances of adult employment. 
109 Enrollment in tertiary education has increased at an accelerating rate across Europe since the onset of the Great 
Recession. This could be an indicator that when facing few job opportunities education becomes a more attractive 
alternative. 
110 In Germany, the high number of temporary contracts is largely explained by their tradition of combining education 
and employment. 
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Furthermore, it can play a screening role for employers, who could find the optimal 
employee without any commitment. In Scandinavian countries, temporary contracts 
have been a successful stepping stone into a career, whereas in Spain and France the 
conversion from a temporary to a permanent contract is very low (Dolado, 2015, pp. 9). 
It is interesting to compare Spain and France because the pre-crisis unemployment rates 
(around 8%) and labor market institutions were relatively similar. However, the 
reaction to the crisis was highly different.111 Aiming at increasing labor market flexibility, 
both Spain and France, has promoted temporary contracts, but in Spain they are more 
common and less regulated. Furthermore, the dismissal cost gap between temporary 
and permanent workers are larger in Spain. In a paper by Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and 
Barbanchon (2010) it is found that the main contributor of the differences in today’s 
unemployment level in these countries lies in the labor market regulations.112 The paper 
is based on the seminal search and matching model by Mortensen-Pissarides (1994), 
were job destruction is endogenous; it is extended by allowing for different 
characteristics of temporary and permanent positions.113 This allows them to explore 
the significance of differences in employment legislation policies on the relatively larger 
increase in Spain’s unemployment, compared with in France. 38% of Spain’s temporary 
workers were dismissed during the recession, whereas the comparable rate for 
permanent workers was only 8% (García Pérez & Castello, 2015). 
Although the French outlook may seem positive when compared to the Spanish, there 
exist large labor market distortions, with a desperate need to be addressed. The strict 
features of the labor market are claimed to be the main issue impeding 
improvements.114 Businesses are demanding relaxation of the current regime that is 
offering those with permanent employment strong protection, at the expense of those 
with temporary contracts (typically young and lower skilled). The employers face high 
minimum wages combined with the fear of not being able to let the number of 
employees follow the business cycle, this pushed temporary contract positions up to 90% 
of all new jobs in 2013 (Carnegy, 2013).  
Policy makers have recognized this problem, and several policies have been initiated. As 
an example; in 2010, Spain implemented a reform aiming at promoting permanent 
employment contracts. This included tax incentives related to hiring permanent 
employees, as well as reduced firing costs and employee compensation (Pissarides, 
2013). Felgueroso and Jansen (2015) argue that the main priority of governments in the 
peripheral regions of Europe should be to tackle the problems related to the dual labor 
market.  
                                                          
111 Institutions such as employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits and wage bargaining. 
112 The article find that 45% of the differences in unemployment rates after the crisis emerged can be explained by 
differences in employment protection legislation.  
113 These characteristics include that only permanent employees can negotiate wages and dismissal costs. 
Probabilities are attached to being temporary or permanently employed, as well as the chance of stepping into a 
permanent position and the rate at which firing permission arrives (due to protection legislation). Realistically, firms 
experience cost when dismissing permanent workers, but no costs are associated with termination of temporary 
contracts. 
114 The French labor regime is by many regarded as one of the most rigid in Europe. 
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5.4 Labor Migration 
Several authors find that economies affected by negative shocks will experience 
increased unemployment and declines in the participation rate. Over time these effects 
will become smaller at the same time as unemployment falls. However, as an economy 
returns back to the pre-shock levels, this is not necessarily solely because employment 
picks up, but also because workers migrate (Blanchard & Katz, 1992; Martin, 2009). 
Blanchard and Katz (1992)conclude that changes in unemployment are the main driver 
of labor mobility, and that regional migration is an important mechanism to stabilize an 
aggregate shock. There are two main arguments for labor migration as an important 
adjustment mechanism. Firstly, foreign labor will absorb part of an adverse shock, 
because there is a tendency for them to return in times of economic distress. Particularly, 
in this recession this has been evident, as the most heavily affected sectors corresponds 
with the sectors with the largest share of immigrant workers (Beets & Willekens, 
2009).115 Secondly, the incentive of workers in the most heavily affected regions to 
emigrate will increase. The high youth unemployment rates have imaginable led to 
further increases in labor migration, as the younger generation display greater mobility 
than the older generation (Braunerhjelm et al., 2000, pp. 51). 
The internal market of the European Union provides individuals with the option of 
migrating to other member countries. This has contributed to a convergence in income 
and unemployment levels across European countries. Increasing labor mobility has been 
one of the major goals for the European Union, as it is believed to improve economic 
welfare by allocating labor more efficiently (Zimmermann, 2004). The ultimate goal of a 
single European Labor market has not yet been achieved. Labor migration is still 
relatively low, and in combination with pervasive wage rigidities, protracted 
unemployment spells are to be expected (Krause et al., 2014). However, Europe has 
come a long way since the Great Depression. Then, the option of migrating in response 
to an adverse shock was not easily attainable as a consequence of the implementation of 
passports and VISAs at the onset of the First World War. In addition to this formal 
restriction, the cultural and language barriers have weakened since the 1930s (Dustman 
& Frattini, 2011). 
In order to rationalize the outcome of a possible increase in labor migration, it is useful 
to draw upon conclusions from trade theory. Traditional trade theory explains labor 
migration, primarily, as advantageous. It is beneficial because internationally mobile 
workers can seek employment where they are most productive, and thus receive higher 
wages, raising the immigrants’ welfare. As a result of labor migrating to where they are 
most productive, world output and aggregate welfare will increase. On the other hand, 
the welfare effects on production factors are unevenly distributed, and differ across time. 
The short term effect can be explained using the Ricardo-Viner framework, where some 
factors (e.g. land or capital) are assumed to be immobile in the short run, whereas labor 
                                                          
115 An example is the Spanish construction and tourism industries. This sector was an important determinant of the 
economic expansion in the decade leading up to the crisis. Furthermore, this sector was responsible for a 
disproportionately large share of immigrant workers, employed on temporary contracts (Beets & Willekens, 2009). 
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is mobile. The Ricardo-Viner model vindicate that the immobile factor in the country 
experiencing an immigration wave will gain in terms of increased real income. However, 
the mobile factor in this country will retrieve a lower real income. The immobile factor 
in the country experiencing emigration will also obtain a lower real income.116 The 
longer term perspective of migration within traditional trade theory is usually explained 
by the Rybczynski theorem, within the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. The major 
difference between the short- and long-term explained by these models is that in the 
longer term all factors of production will be mobile, and hence reallocate until their 
income is equalized across countries. The conclusion will then be that there is no change 
in real income as a consequence of labor migration. However, the countries will 
experience changes in their industry structure as a result of the change in relative factor 
abundance. The host country will become relatively more labor abundant, and this is 
predicted to cause a structural change towards labor intensive industries. 
Immigrant workers contribute to increased government revenues, aggregate demand 
and addressing the skill shortage many countries face. Nonetheless, there are arguments 
against free labor mobility. Firstly, these include distributional effects emerging from the 
increased competition domestic workers will encounter in the labor market. Secondly, 
losses such as deprivation of their most productive workers are faced by the sending 
country. Therefore the skill, employment status and age of migrants are important. 
Unfortunately, an emerging trend, are young highly educated workers emigrating from 
countries where they are; either unemployed or poorly paid, to countries where they 
work in lower-skilled industries for higher wages. The share of intra-EU mobile workers 
with tertiary education increased from 27% to 44%, between 2007 and 2012 (Andor, 
2014). This can result in raised competition faced by the domestic labor force causing a 
divergence in income, and a negative social tension.117 Meanwhile, the sending countries 
in the European periphery are forced to endure erosion of their skilled workers, 
hindering long term growth (Galgòczi, Leschke, & Watt, 2011).118  
More recently, the field of New Economic Geography has pointed out that factor mobility, 
in the presence of economies of scale, is associated with agglomeration of economic 
activity.119 Localized concentration of production factors tends to increase the difference 
in income levels between the economic center and the periphery. Peripheral regions 
have a propensity to become more vulnerable to adverse shocks, and be disadvantaged 
in terms of factor attraction. The increased dispersion in income incentivizes further 
                                                          
116 The marginal productivity of labor will increase in the country experiencing an outflow of workers as the 
remaining ones will become more productive under the assumption of decreasing marginal productivity. The 
marginal productivity of the immobile factor will fall. In the country experiencing an inflow of workers the marginal 
productivity, and hence wages will fall. This contributes to a convergence of wages across countries.  
117 There has been an increase in doubt about the benefits of labor mobility in the past year, so significant that 
Germany, Austria, the UK and the Netherlands wrote a letter to the President of the European Council for Justice and 
Home Affairs concerning a fear that immigration might be a treat to inhabitants’ welfare. http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-
130415_letter_to_presidency_final_1_2.pdf  
118 The higher competition faced by domestic workers might not be present in, for example, Germany as there has 
been a shortage of skilled labor. The “brain-drain” in the countries losing their well educated population can be 
transitory. 
119 New Economic Geography builds on international trade theory, aiming at providing insight into the formation of 
spatial clustering of economic activity.  
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centralization in the presence of high mobility, and as a worst case scenario some areas 
can become desolate (Braunerhjelm et al., 2000, pp. 17-30).  
Figure 29 illustrate how some possible equilibrium scenarios depend on both on the 
degree of factor mobility and the strength of agglomeration forces (Hagen, Heum, 
Haaland, Midelfart, & Norman, 2002). In the presence of low factor mobility or limited 
benefits from clustering, theory predict that industries will be geographically dispersed 
and comparative advantages will be exploited. Another extreme case can occur in the 
presence of high mobility of factors and strong agglomeration gains. This theoretical 
scenario will result in one black hole, implying that all economic activity concentrate in 
one area. If we instead, more realistically, assume that agglomeration forces are strong, 
either within or across industries, but one factor is more mobile than the other, we could 
end up in a polarizing equilibrium where income dispersion between the core and 
periphery is amplified. The last scenario outlined in the matrix below is the case where 
agglomeration forces are strong within industries, but not across. If the factors are 
mobile, we can end up in a scenario of industry black holes, namely self-perpetuating 
industry clusters, geographically dispersed, benefiting from external economies of scale 
(Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 1999). 
Figure 29 – Model explaining how possible outcomes of increased factor mobility in EU depend on agglomeration 
forces (Hagen, Heum, Haaland, Midelfart, & Norman, 2002, pp. 26).  
In the case of the crisis in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the theory of New 
Economic Geography predict that a possible outcome of currency integration, 
asymmetric shocks and factor mobility, is a strengthening of the existing agglomeration 
of economic activity and growth in the northern center, intensifying regional economic 
disparities (Fingleton et al., 2015). One could argue that the recession will strengthen 
the core-periphery pattern, because labor might be inclined to pool towards areas were 
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firms are clustered, as this reduces the risk of unemployment.120 This will have a 
negative impact on those left in the periphery. It might instead be the case that firms 
wish to take advantage of the relatively lower cost of labor in the periphery, which will 
have a centrifugal effect. 
Jauer, Liebig, Martin and Puhani (2014) found that migration within Europe has 
increased as a consequence of the recession. However, it is still not high enough to 
combat the adverse shock to unemployment in Europe. According to statistics from a 
report on migration published by the OECD (2014) we see migration flows to less 
affected countries such as Germany, Sweden, Finland and France and outflows from 
harder hit countries such as Spain, Italy and the UK.121 OECD report that emigration, 
primarily from southern European countries, has increased massively since the crisis 
commenced.122 A large South-North migration wave can contribute to structural changes 
on the aggregate level as the Northern countries will become relatively more labor 
abundant.123  
The economic geography of Europe is inclined to alter in response to the recession. 
There are deep fundamental issues in urgent need to be addressed. The final section of 
this paper will analyze the policy response of the crisis, and explore the future 
opportunities. Which policies have been implemented to improve the grim state of the 
labor market? Which policies have been effective in reaching their goal? Have 
policymakers been able to draw lessons from the past, or experiences of others in 
making efficient policies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
120 New Economic Geography incorporates extremal economies of scale and thus explains that labor market pooling 
will reinforce industry concentration as firms will be inclined to locate closer to areas where labor is clustered. 
Furthermore, these areas will also provide better access to intermediaries, reduced trade costs and higher demand. 
The forward and backward linkages provide cumulative causation as workers wish to live/work where firms are and 
firms wish to be where consumers are. 
121
 EU as a whole has experienced falling immigration since 2007. 
122 This emigration is mainly to northern European countries experiencing lower unemployment; however there is 
also evidence of increasingly many Europeans moving to their earlier colonies. The case of Portugal is one of the cases 
where 12.3% emigrated in 2013, many of them high skilled workers moving to Angola and Mozambique. 
123 According to traditional trade theory (Ricardo-Viner, Heckscher-Ohlin), will an increase in a sector-specific mobile 
factor (e.g. construction workers or engineers from Spain) have a negative short-run impact on this factors marginal 
productivity and therefore on its wages. However, in the long run there will be a structural change as resources will 
allocate towards production in the sector which uses the abundant factor most intensively.  
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6 Policy responses  
The political and social consequences of the depression have largely formed the 
academic field of economics. We have now seen several similarities, in terms of both 
cause and effect, between the Great Depression and the Great Recession. However, the 
policy response then and now are severely different. Similarly to then, policy makers 
face two main challenges; enhance credit availability and restore confidence (Krugman, 
2009). Understanding the effectiveness of the policies of the Great Depression is of high 
importance today, as the nature and cause of the crises are strikingly similar. These 
policies must also be evaluated in comparison with the policy response of today, in 
order to reveal which lessons are in fact learned. The persistence of the Great Recession 
has been weaker than the persistence of the Great Depression; can we thank policy 
responses for this? After a brief introduction, this section will provide a comparative 
overview of the policy responses of the different countries.  
In the midst of the Great Depression John Maynard Keynes wrote;  
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is 
ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”124  
A massive economic crisis developed under the nose of the economic profession. This 
could give the impression that nothing is learned from the past. These ideas, referred to 
by Keynes, seem to be highly persistent; even if history proves them wrong, they have a 
tendency of returning (Temin, 2010, pp. 123). According to Paul Krugman (2015) the 
real sin of economists is not the failure to predict the global crisis, but the tendency to 
cling to doctrines that are obviously not working, also after the crisis commenced.  
The extent to which wrongly implemented policies caused a deeper and longer lasting 
depression has been widely debated, and in the light of the current crisis, it is again a hot 
topic. Keynes argued that the economy is largely demand driven, and that effective fiscal 
policy is the most important ingredient to restoring the economy. Today, conventional 
monetary policy is limited by low interest rates, and much is again depending on 
governmental use of expansionary fiscal policy initiatives (Quiggin, 2010). The massive 
public expenditure program which we do not have today, and that was largely 
responsible for ending the Great Depression was the Second World War. Remarkably, 
unemployment did not rise to prewar levels when the war ended, but kept remaining 
low in most industrialized countries until the early 1970s.  The period that followed, the 
Great Moderation, lasted until 2007-08, and was characterized by lower volatility of 
inflation and output in Europe. This era was marked by major institutional changes, 
especially in the area of monetary policy. Inflation stability, costs of inflation, central 
bank independence and inflation targeting were topics of influence. Cabanillas and 
Ruscher (2008, pp. 12) found that countries relying more heavily on monetary policies, 
                                                          
124 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Income and Money (1936) chap. 24, “Concluding 
Notes”, pp. 190. 
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such as counter-cyclical interest rates, also experienced the largest fall in output 
volatility.  
Although, conventional monetary policy seems to have succeeded in stabilizing prices, it 
did not impede the build-up of financial instability. The immediate global response to 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers required immediate policy responses. The fiscal and 
monetary policy responses that followed are among the most aggressive in history 
(Blinder & Zandi, 2010). Around the world interest rates were drastically cut, fiscal 
stimulus packages where implemented and unconventional monetary policy 
instruments, such as quantitative easing (QE), were used when interest rates hit the 
“zero lower bound”.125  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
125 Quantitative easing is an unconventional method of stimulating the economy though monetary policy, used when 
the interest rates cannot be lowered further. It involves purchasing of longer term assets using Central bank money. 
This will boost inflation by injecting money into the economy through an expansion of the central bank’s balance 
sheet, in addition to having a restoring effect on the price of these assets and lowering the long term interest rates. 
Through QE, the central bank has the ability to affect longer term interest rates by purchasing longer maturity bonds 
driving up the price and down the yield. QE was first implemented in Japan in response to the real estate bubble and 
deflationary pressures experienced in the 1990s 
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6.1 Monetary Policy Response 
The “science of monetary policy” has been going through a dramatic evolution since the 
Great Depression, both empirically and theoretically. One of the main differences has 
been the adaptation of the belief that economic agents possess rational expectations.126 
A central component of monetary policy today is management of these expectations. 
Central banks in industrialist countries have been relatively successful in committing to 
price stability by anchoring expectations. However, as a consequence of the Great 
Depression, it was not only found that price stability played a subordinated role in 
dampening business cycle volatility, over-indebtedness was also manifested as 
amplifying the business cycle (Fisher, 1933). The financial sector holds a prominent role 
in the macroeconomy. This implies that monetary policy and financial stability concerns 
are closely intertwined (Mishkin, 2011). In the aftermath of the recession it can be 
agreed upon that, in the period leading up to the bust, regulation of financial institutions 
was too weak.127 After a brief historical introduction of monetary policy, this section will 
discuss the initiatives by the European Central Bank (ECB), and then by the BoE.  
The monetary policy response of the Great Depression has been heavily criticized for 
being contractionary rather than expansionary. As already mentioned, countries that 
pegged their currency to gold were unable to pursue, much needed, expansionary 
monetary policy. Arguably, the fixed exchange rate system, connecting dissimilar 
economies, was a major transmission mechanism and reason for the depth of the 
depression. A common policy failure during the depression, which has not been 
repeated today, was the implementation of protectionist trade policies (Almunia et al., 
2010). These policies eventually contributed to currency devaluation, a collapse of 
international trade, and a more severe depression. Irwin (2011) found that a major 
reason why countries chose to implement more protectionist policies was inhibited 
monetary policy options due to fixed exchange rate regime. Especially, the countries 
affected by a history of price instability were reluctant to let their currency devalue 
when facing the trilemma of: maintaining the fixed exchange rate, independent 
monetary policy and free trade.128 In a desperate attempt to defend their currency 
Germany, the UK and the US raised rates in 1931-2 (Almunia et al., 2010).129 These 
efforts were not successful in recovering the economy or maintaining the gold parity. 
The UK suffered major devaluation, Germany imposed foreign exchange controls, and US 
also abandoned the gold standard.  
The BoE and the ECB are now using a flexible exchange rate system, targeting inflation 
while taking into account deviations in the output gap. This is creating more freedom to 
                                                          
126 The theory of rational expectations is based on a series of seminal papers by Robert Lucas, written during the 
1970s. The main conclusion is that individuals are using all available information, and are therefore able to optimally 
forecast the future. 
127 Furthermore, the US government encouraged their sponsored agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to expand 
their holding of mortgage backed securities. This governmental intervention contributed to amplify the financial 
instability in the US (Taylor, 2009). 
128 Aiming at reassuring the global monetary system the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created in 1944. 
129 From figure 31 it is clear by the significant increase in interest rates, that, due to historic experience, Germany was 
most afraid of consequences of expansionary monetary policy, such as hyperinflation. Also France faced this fear, 
having experienced high inflation causing political instability, before 1927 (Eichengreen, 1992, pp. 230). 
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implement expansionary monetary policies, using conventional and unconventional 
instruments. From the interest rate illustrations below it is clear that the strategy of the 
Central Banks is different from what it was, responding to the Great Depression.  
In the case of the Great Recession, it is the pre-crisis monetary policy that often is 
criticized. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) argue that the low interest rate kept by the 
Federal Reserve in the years before the crisis contributed to the emergence, as well as 
the depth, of the crisis. In the years following the 2001 recession, the Federal Reserve 
deviated from the “Taylor rule” to an extent not matched since prior to the Great 
Moderation, in the 1970s.130 This ease in monetary excess pushed up the debt levels, and 
reduced the room for action when the crisis hit as they were already close to the “zero 
lower bound” (Taylor, 2009).131 As a consequence of the crisis, reaching the “zero lower 
bound” is now common across industrialized countries. Interest rates have dropped to 
historic lows, without an accompanying boost to aggregate demand due to a weakening 
in the monetary transmission mechanism, largely because of few willing lenders 
(Quiggin, 2010). To combat the unemployment epidemic in Europe growth needs to be 
simulated. Central banks, traditionally, target the short-term nominal interest rate by 
buying and selling short-term debt.132 Deprived of this policy tool, they are forced 
towards adopting unconventional monetary policy instruments. Elements of these 
policies include large-scale liquidity support to banks, and intensified transparency and 
forward guidance of record-low interest rates for a considerable amount of time 
(Pattipeilohy et al., 2013). As illustrated in figure 30, maintaining price stability is highly 
difficult in times of economic crisis, as increased uncertainty has a tendency of reducing 
the confidence in the central bank. 
                                                          
130 The Taylor rule refers to an interest rate rule which was, to a large extent, followed during the Great Moderation in 
the US. It is used as a guideline in Central Banks across the world, and is believed to foster inflation stability. It 
explicitly recommends that; when facing a shock, interest rates should be changed more than one-to-one with the 
change in inflation. 
131 The “zero lower bound” refers to the inflexibility in policy options faced by a Central Bank when the interest rate is 
already set close to zero, because economic agents always have the possibility of holding non-interest bearing cash. 
132 Trade done by the central bank yield changes in the monetary base, and have an impact on the economy through 
the effect on real interest rates, the exchange rate as well as a variety of asset prices. 
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Figure 30 – This figure display inflation and real interest rates over the past 14 years. The recent development of falling 
inflation and increasing real interest rates, is related to the oil price shock. Both series are collected from OECD. 
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A flexible inflation targeting central bank aim to reach their inflation target, as well as, 
maintaining a closed output gap and unemployment close to the natural rate. As a 
consequence of the recent recession, central banks (and other regulators) have 
implemented macro- and micro-prudential considerations, aimed at mitigating the 
systematic risks related to financial stability.133 Woodford (2012) explore the 
consequence on optimal monetary policy of incorporating concerns related to financial 
stability by expanding the standard New Keynesian framework. He incorporates 
heterogeneous agents, such that it includes financial frictions through differing marginal 
utilities of income.134 He concludes that monetary policy should be used as a tool for 
financial stability, even if it implies short term deviation from the inflation target and the 
closed output gap. Therefore, a term devoted to the goal of soothing the chance of 
financial crisis should be included in the central bank’s loss function.135 Nonetheless, it is 
important to keep in mind that other regulators (e.g. the treasury) might be more 
efficient in implementing macro-prudential initiatives, such as counter-cyclical capital 
requirement.136  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
133 Macro-prudential regulation addresses the interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets. Risk factors 
are taken as endogenous, and the ultimate objective of this policy is to limit the build-up of system-wide financial risk. 
134 The agents are heterogeneous in the sense that they are divided into two groups, one is credit constrained and the 
other is saving. This results in differing marginal utilities of income, and a credit spread as savers and borrowers will 
face different interest rates determined by financial intermediaries. 
135 The loss function suggested by Woodford (2012) aim, as usual, at minimising the loss associated with inflation and 
output gap deviation, but it also includes a term, Ω𝑡, representing the losses associated with the distortion of 
expenditure between those who are credit constrained and those who are not: 𝐿𝑡 =
1
2
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡[𝜋𝑡
2 + 𝜆𝑦𝑦𝑡
2 + 𝜆ΩΩ𝑡
2]∞𝑡=0  
136 Lars Svensson argues, in a comment on Woodford’s paper, that monetary policy should be conducted separately 
from financial stability policy as the objectives differ, and because financial stability policy can use instruments to 
more directly affect leverage. This debate is often referred to as lean versus clean. Asking whether the central bank 
should lean against financial frictions, in addition to the output gap/wind, or whether the central bank should 
prioritize cleaning up. I argue that, although, other regulators might have a more direct impact, this does not imply 
that the central bank should not also consider financial stability. 
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6.1.1 The Policy Response of the European Central Bank 
Germany, France and Spain are now governed under the ECB, and no longer have the 
ability to perform independent monetary policy. The implementation of common 
monetary policy for significantly different countries, while keeping fiscal policy at the 
national level, is an experiment unmatched in history. Blanchard and Katz (1992) were 
among those foreseeing that the adjustment process after an adverse-shock to the 
Eurozone might be painful and prolonged.  The main arguments included low factor 
mobility and wage flexibility, heterogeneity between countries and a lack of fiscal 
integration (Mundell, 1961). This results in asymmetric responses in the presence of 
aggregate shocks, especially between the northern and southern Eurozone members 
(Fingleton et al., 2015). Preservation of a fragmented fiscal authority within a currency 
union creates macroeconomic imbalances, and responding policy by a central bank will 
give conflicting consequences to union members. The EMU is currently seen by many as 
a fundamental structural hindrance to improving the European situation (Krugman, 
Piketty, & Stiglitz, 2015). In terms of the impossibility of country independent monetary 
policy, similarities to the fixed exchange rate system of the depression can be drawn. 
For almost a decade, European countries prospered with economic growth and 
converging unemployment rates; the EMU was largely believed to be successful.137 
During this decade, countries, especially in the Southern parts of the continent, were 
able to implement debt funded expansionary fiscal policies, and experience high wage 
growth, while interest rates remained low. These policies were not sustainable, and in 
the wake of the global financial crisis the period of prosperity ended with a massive 
systemic shock; the European sovereign debt crisis. It can be argued that the break-
down of the financial system revealed an underlying structural weakness of the EMU 
(Wolf, 2014). Blanchard (2003) criticized the ECB for having a too low inflation target, 
relative to their policy rate. He foresaw that this could place the Eurozone in a liquidity 
trap, as it created little room for conventional expansionary monetary policy. The belief 
that the EMU would act as a catalyst fostering convergence is to a large extent shattered.    
As illustrated in figure 31, the ECB responded to the crisis by steadily cutting the interest 
rates, stabilizing the plummet in inflation and output.138 In mid-2011, the ECB reached, 
and surpassed, their inflation target of close to, but below, 2%. In response, ECB sent out 
a message of committing to their mandate, raising the interest rate in the fear of broad-
based inflationary pressures over the medium term.139 The increase was favorable to the 
stronger economies, such as Germany, who is still remembering their era of 
hyperinflation. However, the peripheral economies experienced further contraction of 
key indicators, their debt became more costly and the appreciated euro placed 
downward pressures on their international competitiveness.  
                                                          
137 The ECB began exercising monetary policy for the Economic and Monetary Union in January 1999.  
Historical Interest rates collected from A History of Interest Rates by Homer and Sylla (2005), and the current Euro 
area interest rate are collected from the European Central Bank. 
139 Then, ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet vouched that rates should be increased as upside risks to price stability 
was present (Trichet, 2011). The upsurge in inflation was largely contributed by increasing oil prices and strong 
demand in Germany. 
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Figure 31- A comparison of the interest path followed by the Central Bank in 
response to these crises. Ending May 1937 and May 2015. 
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The ECB implemented a 
QE program in 2009, 
aimed at boosting the 
economy. In July 2014, 
the ECB became the 
first large central bank 
to set one of their key 
policy rates negative.140 
The negative deposit 
facility rate has a direct 
impact on the banks 
keeping deposits with 
the central bank. The 
main goal of this was to 
reduce the tendency of 
credit rationing. The negative deposit ratio reduces the attractiveness of keeping excess 
reserves at the central bank, leaving banks with two other options; lending out the funds, 
exceeding the minimum required reserves, to the market, or keep it in cash (European 
Central Bank, 2015).141  The negative deposit facility rate has contributed to a significant 
reduction in the interbank rate, Euribor. The economic strain challenging the Eurozone 
has led to a substantial imbalance in their banking system; a drainage of euro deposits in 
the peripheral regions, meanwhile deposits in other Eurozone nations increased 
(especially in 2011-2012). This imbalance led ECB to design long-term refinancing 
operations aimed at easing this liquidity issue.142  
The success of QE is difficult to quantify, mainly due to the various other initiatives 
implemented in the same timeframe, and the relatively short history disposable for 
research. Nonetheless, several authors have argued that this policy instrument has been 
effective in supporting the Eurozone economy, but not enough to offset the recession 
(Joyce, Miles, Scott, & Vayanos, 2012, pp. 286). Much of the empirical analysis evaluating 
the success of monetary policy during the recession has been conducted using structural 
vector autoregressive models (SVAR).143 Baumeister and Benati (2010) use time-
varying SVARs, in order to capture changes over time in the macroeconomic structure, 
and they find that QE had a significant effect on output growth and inflation through 
reducing the long-term interest rates.  
                                                          
140 The ECB control three key policy rates; main refinancing operations (0,05%), marginal lending facility (0,3%) and 
deposit facility (-0,2%). Danmark was actually the first country to lower their key policy interest rate below zero, in 
July 2012, which was necessary to maintain their peg to the Euro as they are still in the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism system. 
141 It is unlikely that banks choose to hold this money in cash. This would require a large and safe storage facility, 
which would probably be more costly than facing the cost of -0,2% at the central bank.  
142 Since 2008 long-term financing operations (LTRO) by the ECB has been expanded from maximum 3-month 
maturities to 36-month maturity. Most subscribers are banks in periphery countries of the Eurozone. 
143 SVARs are often used in estimating how the economy responds to a particular shock, and therefore for policy 
reasons, because it introduces enough restrictions to identify the shock. The major weakness of this method is the 
sensitivity to misspecifications. 
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6.1.2 The Policy Response of the Bank of England 
The policy response of the BoE was more immediate and aggressive than the response 
by the ECB, arguably, also more consistent. Only 10 months into the recession, BoE had 
responded by reducing interest rates from 5% to 0.5%, where it has been kept since. 
This was, however, not enough to stop the increase in unemployment and fall in GDP. 
First and foremost, the large gap between lenders and borrowers dampened the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. In the spring of 2009, BoE decided to implement QE 
through the Asset Purchase program (APF). Initially, the BoE were authorized to only 
purchase public sector assets, but now also private assets up to a limited amount.144 In 
addition to this, a more transparent policy framework has been implemented to increase 
the credibility of the Central Bank, and hence the effect of policy action (Rogers, Scotti, & 
Wright, 2014). Credibility of a central bank should act as one of the most important 
priorities, because without credibility it is impossible to steer inflation expectations, 
which reduces the effectiveness of monetary policies. The BoE’s forward guidance were 
state contingent upon a 7% unemployment threshold, but as unemployment fell faster 
than expected, and the economy as a whole was still considered weak, there was no 
increase in the interest rate when the threshold was reached. Inflation is currently at 0%, 
and although the BoE still argues that the deflationary trap will be temporary, it is 
unlikely that the interest rate will increase anytime soon. When the increase commence 
it is promised to be gradual.  
When the ECB decided to raise the key policy interest rate in 2011, there were large 
market pressures for BoE to follow in these footsteps, as inflation exceeded the target of 
2%, reaching 4.7% in 2011. However, BoE decided to keep monetary policy rather 
passive, leaning more heavily against the output gap. Giving the economy more time to 
build up a stable recovery seems to have contributed to a raise in confidence and 
investment. In the aftermath, one can argue that the response not to raise interest rates 
was most prudent given the relatively premature economic recovery of that time. 
Figure 32 illustrates 
that the average 
market rate, have been 
reduced by more than 
half the corresponding 
rate in 2008, in 
addition to displaying a 
stable tendency. This is 
indicating that the BOE 
have been relatively 
successful in pinning 
down the market 
expectations. 
                                                          
144 The asset purchase program has increased from £75 billion of public sector assets in 2009, to £375 billion of public 
sector assets, in addition to up to £10 billion in private assets. 
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Figure 32 – Comparison of the interbank rate, the key policy rate and the average 
market rate facing consumers. Source: BoE 
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Figure 33 – The monetary policy response by the BoE has been much more 
aggressive than during the recession. Ending May 1937 and May 2015. 
Furthermore, the evident stability of the average market rate argues success of credible 
forward guidance, calming the market. In terms of the BoE’s success of the QE initiatives, 
the post-crisis macroeconomic developments in the UK suggest improvements since the 
implementation. The commencement of QE was followed by a sharp rise in equity prices 
and fall in bond yields. Economic growth also returned in the fall of 2009, although the 
recovery has remained sluggish (Joyce, Miles, Scott, & Vayanos, 2012). Casual evidence 
of the isolated effect of QE cannot be found as it is no knowledge of how the 
development would have been if QE were never implemented.  
The BoE have also taken a much more aggressive approach in response to the current 
crisis compared to their depression policies. However, the goal of the central bank is not 
the same as during the depression. Figure 33 display a comparison of the key policy 
interest rate in the two crises. As already mentioned, the BoE pegged the pound sterling 
to gold until September 1931, which limited their policy freedom (Howson, 1980). 
During the Great Depression, the Treasury pushed for the government to reduce the 
budget deficit in order to restore the confidence in the currency, and in 1931, both 
unemployment benefits and public sector wages were cut. In September 1931, the BoE 
lead the way others would later follow, leaving the gold standard. As a result, the ability 
to provide expansionary monetary policy reappeared. This is illustrated by the major 
decrease in the key policy rate, immediately after the devaluation of the currency. This 
arguably marked the beginning of the real economic recovery, and all key indicators 
provided in section 3 do depict improvements after the interest rate fell. 
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6.2 Fiscal Policy Response - Youth Labor Market Initiatives 
The liquidity trap, that has captured many industrialized countries as a consequence of 
the crisis, reduced the expansionary policy effectiveness of the central bank, and 
amplified the reliance on efficient fiscal policy (Blanchard, 2003). As a general overview 
of the fiscal policy response is provided in section 3, this section will primarily 
emphasize on labor market policies. A brief overview of the situation of selected 
countries during the depression will be provided, before centralizing on the youth labor 
market initiatives of the Great Recession. 
A resolution to the unemployment issues back in the Great Depression was undoubtedly 
the Second World War. With unsecure employment opportunities and rising poverty, 
there is a tendency to seek new political powers.145 This is one reason for Hitler’s 
hegemony. Hitler managed to gain trust from a diversified specter of voters, including 
those suffering most from the economic crisis. These included non-unionized workers, 
farmers, hourly paid personnel and property owners (Gourevitch, 1984, pp. 110).  
In addition to the Second World War, governments did implement incentives to reduce 
the unemployment issue. The UK government created juvenile unemployment 
centers.146 The objective of these centers was to combat the risk of physical and moral 
deterioration as a consequence of the though transition from war related occupations 
into peace time occupations. However, as the estimates of juvenile unemployment were 
severely underestimated, these centers did not receive enough funding, and contributed 
only modestly to improving the situation. Moreover, by the Unemployment Insurance 
Act of 1927, juveniles were only eligible for benefits if they had been employed for at 
least thirty weeks in insurable work after their 16th birthday, and only those who did 
receive benefits had to attend the program provided by the centers (Garside, 1977, pp. 
324). A similar unemployment benefit regulation existed in most other European 
countries. France also established youth unemployment centers, but more effectively, 
they raised the school leaving age to fourteen (Hesse, 1998, pp.185). Burgess (1998, 
pp.141) argues that if the policy makers had provided more investment in updating and 
providing the education and training demanded by the labor market, it would have 
improved economic efficiency, and reduced the issues faced by the youth.147  
This demand for political change is also present as we face the current crisis, and 
unfortunately a similar pattern as in the 1930s is visible. There has been a rise in 
support of the radical right across Europe (Palmer, 2013). Thomas Piketty (2015) 
argues that the accelerating inequality in Europe is amplified by the crisis, and this is 
one of the major dangers he identify in Europe at the moment. There is a tendency, 
throughout history, of turning to the extreme ends of the political specter as a response 
to failure in solving national social problems. Stiglitz (2015) argue that inequality is 
                                                          
145 Prior to WWI, there were also economic recessions in several of the countries involved in the war. 
146 In 1930 the name was changed from Juvenile Unemployment Centre to Junior Instruction Centers. 
147 Among the criticizers of the education and training level of the youth was the Institution of Electrical Engineers. 
They accused industry and authorities of; not taking responsibility for their employees training and education, and 
providing too abstract or narrow courses for the majority of school leavers, respectfully. 
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restricting the economic recovery, and that the most destructive aspect of inequality is 
high unemployment, particularly when it is concentrated among the young. He further 
argues that if this group of unemployed is skewed towards an ethnic group, 
dysfunctional and disruptive movements are more likely. His conclusion is that 
unproductive youth, deprived of opportunities, is correlated with various negative 
externalities. 
Of countries having understood the importance of providing these necessary 
opportunities, Germany is viewed as the success story in the Eurozone. As already 
elucidated, Germany grant their youth the availability of high quality education and 
vocational training. A figurehead example is their dual educational system which 
involves both relevant work experience and formal schooling. This system is in close 
cooperation with firms, who supply much of the training and financing. Since 2012, 
Germany has contributed to the implementation and advancement of vocational 
opportunities in several countries.148 The goal of these agreements is to implement 
efficient vocational training around Europe so that it becomes easier to recognize the 
quality of vocational degrees across countries, this will ultimately enhance labor 
mobility (Krause et al., 2014). Another initiative implemented to increase labor mobility 
is the European Job Mobility Portal, EURES. It was originally created in 1993, but has 
recently gone through major changes to make it more accessible for both employees and 
employers. In addition to reinforce matching efficiency in the labor market, it provides 
an augmented statistical database on European labor mobility.  
An important point to remember from Germany’s experience, is that the success of a 
reform is not necessarily observable based on its popularity. The Hartz reforms in 
Germany experienced heavily resistance, although the reforms were successful in 
reaching the objectives. A necessary reform might cause a major dilemma for politicians 
wishing to be reelected. Furthermore, it is of high importance to keep in mind that there 
is no uniform recipe to reduce unemployment, especially when facing the heterogeneity 
of the European labor market. This was discussed by Krebs and Martin (2013) in a study 
on the possible impact of the implementation of the Hartz reforms in Spain and France. 
The finding was that the effect would be modest. This was largely because the 
unemployment benefits received by long term unemployed were already low, in 
contrast with the generous system in Germany before the reform. Any reduction in the 
already low benefits would probably not incentivize the desired efficiency gains. 
The UK is headed in the same direction as Germany. During an interview with BBC in 
2014, David Cameron stated that he wanted to abolish youth unemployment.149 The UK 
has implemented three main policy responses to cope with high youth unemployment; 
these policies resemble the youth guarantee described below (Gregg, 2015).  
                                                          
148 Countries in these agreements include France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Latvia, Slovakia, the Netherlands and Greece. 
149 “At heart I want us effectively to abolish youth unemployment. I want us to end the idea that aged 18 you leave 
school, go and leave home, claim unemployment benefit and claim housing benefit. We should not be offering that 
choice to young people. We should be saying to people you should be earning or learning.” 
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Firstly, action has been taken to raise the required educational participation in the 16-19 
age bracket (RPA). This policy involved increasing the participation age to 17 in 2013, 
aiming at raising it to 18 in 2015, with the help from local authorities funding these 
opportunities.150 Participation refers not only to formal schooling, but also to 
apprenticeship or vocational training. It is believed that this will; both reduce youth 
unemployment and ease the transition from school to work.151 Cahuc and Carcillo (2015) 
argue that expanding the options for those with less interest in academic subjects will 
improve the labor situation facing the youth. The academic focus is hindering many 
young from obtaining a diploma. An initiative in France have been to open several state 
training centers, aiming at creating sustainable opportunities for young people who has 
dropped out of formal education. 
Secondly, programs to enhance youth’s work experience were implemented; these were 
primarily designed for disadvantaged youth. The initiative providing experience was 
introduced in the fall of 2009, and is called Future Jobs Fund (FJF).152 The aim is to 
prevent the long-term negative impact upon young people who experience prolonged 
unemployment. Temporary wage subsidies for employers hiring young people are 
implemented to cope with this situation.153 Any organization could apply for the 
necessary funding to create job placements as long as they meet the necessary 
criteria.154 
Thirdly, efforts have been made to increase apprenticeship opportunities for young 
people. Until now, the success has been limited, but the government is planning to 
increase the support for apprenticeships for those under 24. When training and 
apprenticeship opportunities are available for everyone below 24, the government will 
implement a new young Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) claimant’s scheme. This scheme 
will state that those claiming unemployment benefits with less than level two 
qualifications in English and Math would be required to attend up to 16 hours of 
education/training, in addition to the already required time spent on job search.155 
The measures done in Spain to cope with the unemployment crisis includes a reform of 
savings banks, improved conditions for competition, educational reforms and reforms in 
labor-market institutions. The labor market reforms aim at promoting greater internal 
flexibility, reducing firm’s incentives to hire temporary employees and subsidies to firms 
hiring young, low-skilled and women. Spain has also undergone a reform including 
                                                          
150 The success of increasing the participation rate is largely contributed by the youth’s own response to the crisis. As 
their employment opportunities fell many responded by extending their participation in education, even before RPA 
was implemented. 
151 This transition will not be effective until there is a strong upsurge in the labor market, as further increases in 
vacancies are needed for this to be fulfilled. 
152 It was later repackaged and slightly changed by the new government, to the Work Programme and Youth Contract.  
153 This has also been proven successful in France.  
154 The criteria includes; placement should be at least 25 hours a week with at least minimum wage, placement should 
be created for the purpose of giving experience and last for at least six months, the work underdone should benefit the 
local community and placement providers are required to provide support for participants when they are moving into 
sustained employment (Fishwick, Lane, & Gardiner, 2011). 
155 Adults with math skills below Level 2 may not be able to compare products and services for the best buy, or work 
out a household budget. The expected English speaking and listening skills of a 7-9 year old is entry level 2. 
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massive cuts in wages, aiming for an internal devaluation which can raise their 
international competitiveness (Evans-Pritchard, 2014).  
In 2013, the European Commission implemented the Youth Guarantee scheme, in 
response to the fear of a lost generation in Europe. The specific aim is to entitle young 
people under 25 to relevant employment, further education, an apprenticeship or a 
traineeship, within the first four months of finishing education or becoming unemployed. 
The scheme aims at improving the transition from school to work and the labor market 
outcomes of the European youth. All EU members have commenced implementation, but 
at varying acceleration. The degree of success of this initiative is too early to evaluate, 
but chances are that it will succeed in improving the school-to-work transition (Dolado, 
2015). Below is an outline of the Youth Guarantee progression in the selected countries. 
France is encouraged to increase the availability of apprenticeships, particularly aimed 
at the low-skilled. Following the presentation of France’ Youth Guarantee 
implementation plan in 2013, further increases in youth unemployment have been 
prevented. However, significant struggles related to communication, outreach and 
coordination strategies remain. As for Germany, historically low youth unemployment is 
achieved, and the current main objectives are related to ensuring long term stability in 
the labor market. However, young migrants across the country and youth located in the 
eastern regions are disproportionately disadvantaged, and enhanced integration is an 
objective. The Youth Guarantee implementation in the UK prioritizes improving the 
match between labor demand and the skillset provided by educational institutions. 
Their main strategy in guaranteeing opportunities for the younger generation is the 
reduction of low-skilled youth, and improvements have been evident. Spain has the most 
comprehensive list of recommended implementations. 944 million euros have been 
allocated to improve the outreach to young people by providing high quality 
employment and labor market relevant traineeships and apprenticeships. So far the 
coverage of the national Youth Guarantee system has been relatively limited (European 
Commission, 2015).  
The Youth Guarantee initiative contains important elements, improving the future 
prospects of the European Youth. However, the goals are ambitious and extensive time 
for implementation is required. Furthermore, it is projected that gains from this 
initiative will be significantly reduced if stimulation of economic growth is absent 
(Dolado, 2015). 
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7 Conclusion 
The turbulence experienced by the world since 2008 bear numerous similarities to the 
Great Depression. To conclude this comparative analysis, it is clear that the Western 
world is, once more, involved in a “colossal muddle”, which will have a highly persistent 
negative impact on economies. The theoretical modelling tools used by economists have 
undergone significant changes since the Great Depression. Still, the mainstream 
macroeconomic theoretical framework failed to predict the Great Recession, as well as 
offering an optimal response (Quiggin, 2010). Common assumptions, such as rational 
expectations and representative agents, are used to simplify reality, but possibly too 
much. In the aftermath of the crisis, we find a great need for a new Keynesian framework 
with a more realistic micro-foundation, by for example incorporating financial frictions, 
trust and confidence as endogenous variables. This need is recognized, and the quality of 
research within this field is improving. Economics need to reallocate focus toward 
realism, equity and humility, away from rigorous mathematics, efficiency and hubris 
(Quiggin, 2010). This section outlines the main conclusions to be drawn from the 
sections of this thesis, including recommendations for further policy action. 
It is seven years since the pre-crisis peak of industrial production, and none of the 
countries compared in this paper have been able to surpass this benchmark. The world 
has escaped a second great depression, but the overall fall in investment and production 
has contributed to a dangerously weak labor market. The youth have suffered a 
disproportionate share of job losses in the current crisis, relative to during the Great 
Depression. It is crucial to determine the nature of the labor market changes. I argue that 
these changes are structural, and without an abrupt positive turn in the economic 
outlook, the process of reform can become excruciating and prolonged.   
The Beveridge curve analysis provides insight into the cyclical and structural 
components inherent in the unemployment statistics. The tendency for high 
unemployment to persist, meanwhile other economic indicators return to trend, 
suggests presence of permanent inefficiency in the matching process. The Beveridge 
curves in section 4, illustrates that only Germany has experienced an improvement in 
labor market efficiency since the crisis. This improvement is evidently a result of the 
Hertz labor market reforms, which were implemented earlier in the decade. I 
recommend other countries to follow the German example by enhancing vocational 
training and transferable occupational skills. This is proven to be highly effective, and 
countries with low unemployment rates, typically, do offer vocational training, adapted 
to firm’s current needs. Boone and van Ours (2004) argue that increased spending on 
labor market training is the most effective form of intervention to improve the youth’s 
situation. Dolado (2015) finds lack of vocational training as one of the main reasons 
behind high youth unemployment, and concludes by recommending that European 
governments devote substantial resources to active labor market policies for the youth. 
The recovery of the labor market situation is contingent on strengthened economic 
growth. In achieving this, Europe will face severe challenges amplified by exhausted 
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governmental budgets and zero-bound interest rates, restraining fiscal and monetary 
policy, respectively. In his seminal paper on optimal currency areas, Robert Mundell 
(1961)concluded that one of the essential features needed in a single currency area is 
high factor mobility. This would enhance economic stability and absorb adverse shocks. 
I believe further encouragement of labor mobility is key to mitigating the crisis in the 
Eurozone. As explained in section 5, higher labor mobility will likely improve matching 
efficiency by balancing the supply of and demand for labor leading to increased 
economic growth (Krause et al., 2014). Without increased labor mobility it will be 
challenging for the ECB to maintain full employment and price stability across the 
Eurozone, particularly, because the geographical domain of the Eurozone does not 
coincide with a geographical fiscal authority domain. Therefore, improved adjustment 
mechanisms to combat regional asymmetries, such as enhanced fiscal integration, 
should be implemented. If long term stability is to be achieved, the heterogeneity of the 
Eurozone countries is advocating a need for increased political unification. 
Nonetheless, the persistent effect on most variables has been weaker as a consequence 
of the Great Recession, in comparison with the Great Depression. According to Blinder 
and Zandi (2010) we can thank policy responses for this. He argues that the global 
economic situation would have looked a lot grimmer without these policy responses. 
However, this does not mean that all the policies implemented have been optimal, nor 
does it imply how the world would have been. It means that it was right for 
policymakers to act and abandon the laissez faire framework, which was leading in 
several industrialized countries. It is important to draw on lessons from both crises, and 
an important conclusion is that efficient regulatory governance of financial institutions 
is key to ensure economic stability (Aikins, 2009).   
Being in a situation with high risk aversion and low market confidence, central banks 
are facing a considerable policy challenge in simulating growth. We are sluggishly 
recovering from a time of great difficulty; borrowers need liquidity to save their 
business, and lenders incentive to provide capital are lowered as they have experienced 
default of presumably stabile borrowers. Furthermore, productive projects are needed 
to boost the economy in order to confront the labor market crisis.156 Bridging the gap 
between borrowers and lenders will be gradual, but the reduced spread between market 
rates and the key policy rate in the UK, as well as in the Eurozone, indicate that the 
monetary transmission mechanism have improved drastically.157 What still remains to 
be learned, is whether the bond purchasing are contributing to the buildup of 
unsustainably high debt levels. It is important that macro- and micro-prudential 
                                                          
156 “But there cannot be a real recovery, in my judgement, until the ideas of lenders and the ideas of productive 
borrowers are brought together again; partly by lenders becoming ready to lend on easier terms and over a wider 
geographical field, partly by borrowers recovering their good spirits and so becoming readier to borrow.”         
– John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion. 
157 The lowest lending rates in the UK have dropped from 7% to 3.5% since the onset of the crisis, see figure 32. 
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frameworks will be prioritized, also in the future.158 This will mitigate possible future 
reliance on unconventional monetary policy (Joyce, Miles, Scott, & Vayanos, 2012). 
In order to prevent a longer-lasting exclusion from the labor market there is an urgent 
need of efficient policy action. To relieve this situation, the workforce composition must 
be reformed in order to become suitable for the structural change of European 
economies (André, et al., 2013). Moreover, real economic growth must be further 
advocated, as this is required for long term utilization of available resources. The 
European Commission is confident that the Youth Guarantee implemented in 2013 has a 
prominent role in improving the labor market situation. The efficiency of the Youth 
Guarantee depend on policymakers ability to address the structural strain of the labor 
market, otherwise Europe might be deprived of a generation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
158 This paper has not placed much focus on micro-prudential policies, but these are also significant for financial 
stability. Micro-prudential regulation has a firm-level perspective, and can be argued less relevant for discussion of 
this crisis, as it assumes that the risk of a systemic financial crisis is exogenous. However, ensuring solvency of private 
financial institutions is key in restoring consumer confidence. Basel III is possibly the most important regulatory 
framework implemented in response to the crisis, reducing systemic risk (Basel III includes, both macro-and micro-
prudential consideration) (Osinski, Seal, & Hoogduin, 2013). 
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